After Euro 2008, Vicente del Bosque took the reins of the Spanish national team from Luis Aragonés, the man that led Spain to their first international tournament conquest since 1964 when they hosted and won the second UEFA European Championships, known then as the European Nations’ Cup.
Aragonés’ tactical style went completely away from former Spain bosses Javier Clemente and, to a lesser extent, José Antonio Camacho and Iñaki Sáez with a fluid, passing, possession game that would frustrate the opposition into defending for most of the match. Aragonés lifted the underachieving moniker off this Spanish national team and infused the confidence and the mental fortitude that the Spanish player did not command for the better part of fifty years.
Whereas Aragonés displayed a more demonstrative attitude both on the training pitch and the technical area, del Bosque showed an understated and tranquil demeanor that would also work with a dressing room full of world-class players and egos.
Vicente del Bosque’s breakthrough came in 1999 when he succeeded John Toshack at Real Madrid, and in his four years at the Santiago Bernabéu, he delivered two UEFA Champions League titles and two La Liga titles among his greatest accomplishments. If there were a melting pot of potential rifts in world football, Real Madrid would lead the way in this competition. Even as President Florentino Pérez and sporting director Jorge Valdano began to seize total control over player personnel, del Bosque soldiered on without creating ripples and keeping to the job at hand.
Del Bosque knew that he inherited a well-oiled machine from Luis Aragonés after Euro 2008, and to change that style could mean a precipitous fall from grace. For some managers, they have to put their stamp on their team, even if it is to the team’s detriment. With the players currently established on the national team, the way they currently play suits these players perfectly. Del Bosque’s humble nature ensured that he would not interfere negatively with this team. Why change what works, and del Bosque continues to follow this line of thinking.
What Vicente del Bosque has done that is different from Luis Aragonés has brought a sense of calm and serenity that was needed when Spain’s outstanding results could have left the team complacent and without urgency. Even if the United States did not upset Spain at the semifinal stage of the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup to end their thirty-five match unbeaten streak, del Bosque had the demeanor and the respect of the players to quell any sort of arrogance that could have easily built over this amazing run. Spain played with their Plan A, and they were going to live and die by that strategy.
For the Dutch, the Clockwork Orange of the 1970s with Rinus Michels as the mastermind and Johan Cruyff and Johan Neeskens as the total footballers created the mystique behind the Netherlands national football team. After this era of Dutch football, those who followed in their footsteps needed to live up to their example. As with all national teams, throwing twenty-three different personalities for a short amount of time could lead to a tumultuous cacophony of noise, and the in-fighting among the Dutch footballers has been well documented. If only a small part of this fighting, emulating their forefathers while achieving positive results took a toll on the Dutch national team.
Installing Bert van Marwijk as the national coach after Euro 2008 seemed to continue this tradition as they rolled through World Cup qualification, albeit in a consensus easy group. Their pre-World Cup friendlies saw no indication of a stylistic change as they breezed through Mexico, Ghana, and Hungary, the former two being World Cup teams that had decent chances to advance into the latter stages of the tournament.
Van Marwijk, however, made the brave decision to abandon this notion of total football somewhat and adopt a more pragmatic style. Mark van Bommel and Nigel de Jong became van Marwijk’s destroyers in the defensive midfield while allowing Wesley Sneijder, Robin van Persie, and Arjen Robben to play their football in the final third. Breezing through their World Cup group and the Round of 16 against Slovakia, they faced Brazil in the quarterfinals, who themselves had gone through a minor facelift under Dunga to a more physical style. Felipe Melo and Gilberto Silva vs. van Bommel and de Jong became the main battle throughout the match, even though the glamour players had their moments. The Netherlands survived the encounter, and after a captivating semifinal against Uruguay, the talk roused up from the Dutch about how they were going to attack the Spanish.
Dirk Kuyt became the Dutch representative of this bravado, taking a dig at Germany’s performance while touting his team’s own intentions for the final against Spain when speaking to The Guardian:
“We are not afraid at all. You could see the Germans were afraid of Spain. They didn’t try to attack. We are going to attack and then you will see weaknesses coming to the surface. If you play like the Germans, you are definitely going to lose. We don’t have players who are afraid and we don’t have players who feel small against the big opponents. There is respect but not fear.”
After the first fifteen minutes of the final, the Dutch did not live up to the big game they talked before the World Cup final. Spain definitely deserved credit for frustrating the Netherlands with their ability to play keep-ball, but the initial and nominal pressure they initiated in the Spanish half of the pitch dissipated by the tenth minute as they began to pack the midfield and the defense in their own half of the field. Physical became more cynical to near violent as Mark van Bommel chopped down Andrés Iniesta and Xavi Hernández on more than a few occasions, and Nigel de Jong infused the spirit of Jean-Claude Van Damme in Bloodsport when he sent his flying, extended leg straight into the chest of Xabi Alonso.
