The fallacy surrounding <a href="https://worldsoccertalk.com/teams/manchester-united-tv-schedule/">Manchester United</a> in recent seasons has been that of the midfield diamond. A tactical concept, and a strategical structure, deriving at Manchester United from how Bobby Charlton was deployed in the 1960s.



A deep-lying center forward, alongside hard-tackling midfield creator-destroyers, such as Maurice Setters, Paddy Crerand, David Sadler, or Nobby Stiles. Bringing into play with long-range pinpoint passes, left and right wingers, for example, Johnny Giles, John Connelly, John Aston, and George Best. A former left winger himself, Charlton was known for success with his long-range shooting and passing game in the second half of the 1950s. He combined this with a short passing game of quick interchanges through the middle in the 1960s, carving out opportunities for forwards. Either Quixall, Herd, Law, Best, or Kidd, in their period of success. Beginning with the FA Cup in 1963, league titles in 1964-65 and 1966-67, and the 1968 European Cup, Charlton was United’s original diamond.



<h2>United’s diamond in the 1980s and 90s</h2>



The modern theory of the central midfield attacker, as an auxiliary forward, supporting a lone striker in front of him isn’t what Manchester United did with their diamonds. Alongside England captain Bryan Robson (1982-91) in English manager Ron Atkinson’s early 1980s United team, Ray Wilkins, and then Norman Whiteside, in a two-man midfield, were diamonds. While Wilkins, and later Whiteside, took the holding midfield role, Robson was free to move forward in support of the forwards and vice versa. The player going up the field was the lower point of the diamond in tactical terms. Meanwhile, the left and right wings were the corners of the diamond, with the striker constituting the sharper end.



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><div><figure class="image"><img loading="lazy" width="1280" height="715" src="https://media.worldsoccertalk.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2024/01/16051111/ManUnitedDiamond_Alex-1280x715.webp" alt="Alex Ferguson United Diamond" class="wp-image-481304" sizes="(max-width: 1280px) 100vw, 1280px"></figure></div></figure>



However, there were twin strikers, which was the point that remained underemphasized in the era after Alex Ferguson’s managerial reign. With England’s Paul Scholes, United went on to amass 11 league titles, three FA Cups, two League Cups, two Champions Leagues, and two Intercontinental Cup/World Club Cup wins with several sets of twinned strikers ahead of him in the diamond.



Scotland’s Brian McClair and Wales’ Mark Hughes, and Frenchman Eric Cantona, were responsible for United’s early success under Ferguson’s stewardship. However, both McClair and Hughes were there for Scholes when he made his debut in the 1994-95 season. United with McClair, then deployed in a deeper, midfield diamond role, Cantona, and diamond-hard Scholes won the FA Cup and League double once more. And they captured the title again in 1996-97 when Cantona retired.



<h2>Into the new millennium</h2>



Dwight Yorke (1998-2002; 48 goals) and Andy Cole (1995-2001; 93), Ole Gunnar Solskjaer (1996-2007; 91) and Teddy Sheringham (1997-2001; 31), and Solskjaer and Ruud van Nistelrooy (2001-06; 95), were ahead of Scholes’ diamond. United completed the treble of the Premier League, FA Cup, and Champions League in 1999. They then added the Intercontinental Cup for good measure. League titles followed in rapid succession; 1999–2000, 2000–01, and 2002–03, and the FA Cup in 2004.



The partnerships of van Nistelrooy and Louis Saha, Saha and Wayne Rooney, Rooney and Alan Smith, and van Nistelrooy and Rooney, brought League Cup success in 2006, and further successive titles. The pairings of Rooney and Argentina’s Carlos Tevez, Tevez and Dimitar Berbatov, Rooney and Berbatov, Berbatov and Javier Hernández, Rooney and Danny Welbeck, and Rooney and Robin van Persie, brought additional league and cup success as the first decade of the 2000s rolled towards an end. However, with Darren Fletcher injured in 2011-12, Scholes resumed his United diamond role in the FA Cup 3rd Round defeat of Manchester City. In 2012–13 the last of Ferguson’s, and Scholes’, titles was won.



<h2>The Manchester United midfield diamond, post-Ferguson</h2>



Successive managers have failed to approach the same level of success as Ferguson. This is primarily because they failed to understand the importance of the diamond to <a href="https://www.manutd.com/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Manchester United</a>.



Van Gaal thought he could play three center-halves. These included Jonny Evans, Phil Jones, Chris Smalling, Marcos Rojo Luke Shaw, and Daley Blind. Gaal’s strategy was allied to former wingers in the role of wing halves. Both fullbacks, Antonio Valencia and Ashley Young, had been right and left wingers before Ferguson switched them to defense. This tactic harkened back to the 1900s, when United had a famous halfback line of Duckworth, Roberts, and Bell, who won titles in 1908 and 1911, and the FA Cup in 1909.



Van Gaal experimented until victory in the 2016 FA Cup Final against Crystal Palace. By the time the lineups were announced, it was clear the Dutchman had accepted the United Way. The team took the field at Wembley Stadium employing the usual two-man midfield, wingers, and twin strikers. Wayne Rooney was billed to appear in the Scholes’ diamond role in midfield, behind Marcus Rashford as the lone striker. Valencia started the match, and Ashley Young came on in the 72nd minute as a left winger, as Italy’s Matteo Darmian had already replaced Rojo at left back in the 66th minute, where they flanked Daley Blind and Chris Smalling.



Carrick and Marouane Fellaini were in midfield, with Juan Mata and Anthony Martial on the left and right wings. Wayne Rooney and Marcus Rashford were the twin strikers. Winger Jessie Lingard came on in the 90th minute for Mata, who’d volleyed in left-footed a cross from Wayne Rooney into the penalty area to equalize. However, it was Lingard who scored the winning goal.



<h4>Mourinho arrives…</h4>



The win wasn’t enough to keep Van Gaal in the manager’s seat. José Mourinho, arriving via Chelsea, galvanized the players to win the club’s first Europa League trophy, against Ajax. They’d win the League Cup again, bringing in Swedish striker Zlatan Ibrahimović to pair with Marcus Rashford up front. Zlatan scored twice against Southampton, and United ran out winners, 3-2. Paul Pogba, winner of the 2011 FA Youth Cup with United against Sheffield United, was brought back by Mourinho for £89m to partner with Ander Herrera in midfield.



However, Carrick and Fellaini weren’t overlooked. For example, Fellaini played in the diamond behind Zlatan in the defeat of Ajax.



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><div><figure class="image"><img loading="lazy" width="1280" height="715" src="https://media.worldsoccertalk.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2024/01/16051112/ManUnitedDiamond_Mou-1280x715.webp" alt="United Diamond Mourinho" class="wp-image-481300" sizes="(max-width: 1280px) 100vw, 1280px"></figure></div></figure>



<h4>…and Mourinho leaves </h4>



Despite the arrival of Belgian forward Romelu Lukaku, United’s failure to capture the 2018 FA Cup led to Mourinho’s dismissal. The results largely resulted from United’s playing a 4-3-3 system, with Pogba in the center of a midfield that also contained Nemanja Matić and Herrera. Chilean forward Alexis Sánchez was brought from Arsenal in an ultimately disastrous January swap deal for the previous season’s Europa Cup-winning Henrik Mkhitaryan. Alexis would score only 3 times before joining Italy’s Inter Milan for their 2019-20 campaign. Together with Lingard and Rashford, Alexis couldn’t prey on United’s clipped wings, while the squad was similarly lacking in inventiveness from a midfield diamond.



<h2>Solskjaer takes the reins</h2>



The legendary Cristiano Ronaldo was brought back by Ole Gunnar Solskjær for the 2021-22 campaign for €15m from Italy’s Juventus, where CR7 had won Serie A titles in 2018-19 and 2019-20.



In the Europa League Final, Solskjaer had started with forwards Marcus Rashford, Edinson Cavani, and England’s Mason Greenwood, although Rashford and Greenwood were nominally left and right wings. With Fernandes as the diamond midfield creator, in front of central midfielders, Scot Scott McTominay and Paul Pogba, Ralf honored Bruno’s talent but denied United their traditionally successful paired twin striker combination with wingers. When Rangnick’s team drew with Atlético in the last 16 of the Champions’ Cup, Ronaldo and England’s Jadon Sancho were nominally the wingers, although the absence of the second striker was palpable, and the same was true of the second leg at home, which they lost, 0-1, with Fernandes in the diamond behind Elanga for the most part, rather than the more experienced Rashford, 11 league goals that season.



However, Solskjaer, whose side were runners-up in the league to City and Europa Cup finalists the previous season, was sacked on November 21st, 2021 with United seventh in the table.



United had to wait until the League Cup in 2023 for their next trophy, under Erik Ten Hag.



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<div class="ck-youtube"><iframe loading="lazy" title="George Best: Interview with Duncan Hamilton About George Best&apos;s Life" width="500" height="281" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/R_5ZiNZgEb4?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen=""></iframe></div>
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<h2>The Ten Hag era</h2>



Ten Hag was appointed on April 21st, 2022.



The Dutchman Ten Hag moved quickly in the transfer market, bringing in Lisandro Martinez from Ajax, and Dutch left-back Tyrell Malacia, to strengthen the defense. Christian Eriksen and the Brazilian Casemiro strengthened his midfield options, while Brazilian winger Anthony gave the team another attacking ploy. However, the role of Bruno Fernandes as the midfield diamond remained problematic, with the option of fielding a single winger, and two strikers, or three strikers, masquerading as left and right wingers, invariably prevailing to the detriment of the club’s desire for success.



Although scoring 18 times in the 2020-21 campaign, Bruno’s inability to fit into a midfield of two limited United’s striking capability. The 2023 League Cup Final defeat of Newcastle United with Wout Weghorst at center forward, who didn’t score, further exacerbated the issue. Left-footed Anthony appeared on the right wing, with center forward Rashford on the left, without a recognized goal scorer in the center. Although Casemiro, with a 33rd-minute header, and Rashford, with a 39th-minute strike, secured the trophy, it left the diamond looking rather offset.



Moreso, rivals Man City, then beat United 2-1 in the June 3rd F.A. Cup Final. United’s four-man midfield, including Eriksen, labeled AM (auxiliary midfielder), deployed Casemiro and Brazilian Fred in the center. Fernandes, nominally on the right wing, did score an equalizing penalty in the 33rd minute. City left-wing Jack Grealish was controversially judged by VAR to have handled the ball, as England’s United right-back Aaron Wan-Bissaka attempted to head on. However, with only center forward Rashford and left winger Sancho recognizable as forwards, the diamond was perceivably out of its setting.



<h2>2023-2024 – make or break?</h2>



United has had nine defeats before January in the 2023-24 term, lying supine in seventh. They also didn’t qualify for the 2024 Europa League, finishing fourth in their Champions League group. With just one win against Copenhagen and a lone draw in six games, and already out of the League Cup, only time would tell if Ten Hag would be saved by another good cup run – or wingers and a pair of strikers.



With or without a midfield diamond or two, improvement at Manchester United can be seen waiting in the wings. Argentina’s Alejandro Garnacho joined United’s youth system from Atlético Madrid in October 2020 for £450,000, scoring a career-announcing twice from the left wing in United’s 2022 FA Youth Cup Final win over Nottingham Forest. He was alongside center midfielder Kobbie Mainoo, who had six first-team starts in 2023-24 before New Year’s Eve. Garnacho started five times, with 14 appearances as a substitute, in 2022-23, before a career-establishing 3rd-minute left-footed overhead kick in an away win at Everton.



Photos: Imago.

Manchester United and the evolution of its midfield diamond

Manchester United and the midfield diamond tactical strategy have a long history of success, from the 1950s right through today.

Manchester United and the evolution of its midfield diamond - World Soccer Talk

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While the result was in doubt deep into the second half, Chelsea rose to earn a 3-1 result at Stamford Bridge.
The Torres-Drogba saga was revived in this match. Manager Andre Villas-Boas started both forwards up front. AVB settled on an attacking diamond formation, with John Obi Mikel set back to help out the defenders with what tends to be a quick Norwich counterattack. This choice of diamond formation again showed Chelsea’s desire to play in the center of the pitch, rather than use wider players to create room. Fernando Torres did move wide right some, and Ashley Cole was also quick to move forward to help on the left, and while Malouda did contribute on the left, he wasn’t particularly inventive.
Norwich City has shown to favor the diamond formation under Paul Lambert, but in this match they varied slightly from this formula. They effectively dropped the defensive midfielder into the backline, in the form of center half Leon Barnett. This gave them a 3/5-man backline, presumably to handle the duo of Didier Drogba and Fernando Torres. Norwich still had a three-man midfield to deal with the narrow 4 of Chelsea. Grant Holt was the primary striker for the Canaries, with Chris Martin being more of a #10.
Chelsea grabbed the early lead as Norwich looked uncomfortable in a 5 man backfield. Fullback Bosingwa accepted a pass from Frank Lampard 7 yards outside the area, had lots of space, and took a 20 yard shot that beat John Ruddy to his right less than 6 minutes in. Bosingwa was in the space that likely would have been occupied by a holding midfielder, but he was left unmarked and took full advantage.
American defender Zak Whitbread was injured early in the match, which provided Lambert a convenient reason to adjust his tactic. He brought on left midfielder Anthony Pilkington, which pushed the Canaries into a somewhat defensive diamond. Both teams had their opportunities in the first half, but the half concluded with Chelsea in front.
There were no major tactical changes heading into the second half. While Chelsea dominated possession to start the second half (127 Chelsea passes to 33 for Norwich through the 62nd minute), the combination of Drogba and Torres wasn’t fluid, and this caused their efforts in the final third to be less than spectacular (two set piece shots and two from long range).
In the 63rd minute, a mistake cost them their lead. Chelsea’s goalkeeper Hilario came out to grab a high cross into the area. Center back Branislav Ivanovic failed to hear Hilario call him off, and they collided. The ball went straight up, and it fell to Holt. He quickly volleyed the ball into the open net before John Terry could retreat to cover.
After the equalizer, the faithful at Stamford Bridge were getting antsy, but quickly their attention would turn to the health of one of their favorites. As Drogba leapt to reach a cross in the area, Ruddy punched him in the side of the head with both fists. The forward laid unconscious on the ground for several minutes. Reports as of this writing say that Drogba received a serious concussion.
After the injury, Nicolas Anelka replaced the injured striker. At the same time, new signing Juan Mata was introduced into the lineup for the first time, coming on for Florent Malouda. Tactically, Villas-Boas adopted a hybrid three-forward set, with Mata and Anelka trading who would drop deeper to help link play. The fact remained that Chelsea continued to dominate possession, but lacked a creative flair to pull ahead. And if not for another game-changing moment in the 80th minute, a draw looked likely.
On the counterrush, Anelka fed a ball diagonally through to Ramires. After a heavy touch into the box, he and Ruddy came together at the ball. Ramires arrived a bit earlier, and Ruddy was called for the penalty after he tripped the Brazilian midfielder. Ruddy was also shown off for a last-man foul, a punishment that seemed harsh for the situation. Lampard’s penalty kick bested replacement keeper Declan Rudd, fired behind him down the middle for the decisive goal.
Down a man, Norwich still had opportunities, especially with 11 minutes of injury time. Substitute Steve Morison (for Wes Hoolahan) had a couple of opportunities on the break, but failed to effectively pull the trigger. But as Chelsea applied more pressure, a defensive lapse in the corner by the Canaries allowed Mata to dribble towards goal. He carved a shot past Rudd near the end of stoppage time to seal the 3-1 victory.
For a second week, the Canaries dropped points after a referee ejected one of their players. Their play, while not strong on possession, has been based on the quick counterstrike. Holt is a fun, somewhat feisty player to watch up front. We still haven’t seen enough of Simeon Jackson, and perhaps we would have seen him if not for the red card.
With regards to Juan Mata, here is a graphic that shows the comparison between him and Florent Malouda (Mata on bottom). In only 30 minutes, Mata completely 27 of 30 passes, while Malouda was successful on only 32 of 44 in about 64 minutes of play. Mata’s touches always seemed exciting, bringing a cutting edge to the match. His goal was well-deserved, in my opinion.
 by&nbsp;<a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/chalkboards">Guardian Chalkboards</a>
Finally, I’d just like to pray that Drogba is able to make a full recovery from what happened today. He has been one of the greats in the Premier League. We’ve all seen these types of horrible collisions, and fortunately in this day and age medical professionals take these injuries very seriously. I hope this guy is able to rehabilitate back to full health, and gets back out there to dazzle us with his skills.

Chelsea 3-1 Norwich City: Tactics Review

Chelsea 3-1 Norwich City: Tactics Review - World Soccer Talk

<div style="text-align: center"><a href="http://view.picapp.com/pictures.photo/entertainment/coachella-valley-music/image/8568569?term=radiohead" target="_blank"><div><figure class="external-image"><img loading="lazy" src="http://view2.picapp.com/pictures.photo/image/8568569/coachella-valley-music/coachella-valley-music.jpg?size=500&amp;imageId=8568569" border="0" alt="INDIO, CA - APRIL 18: Musician Thom Yorke performs during day 3 of the Coachella Valley Music &amp; Art Festival 2010 held at The Empire Polo Club on April 18, 2010 in Indio, California. (Photo by Michael Buckner/Getty Images)" width="500" height="391"></figure></div></a></div>
In our ever evolving online community, where any Joe, Tim or Reba can start a blog, post, pontificate or reminisce, the lost art of responsibility can evade even the most keenly trained eye. As budding young bloggers dressed all in their khakis attempt the fine art of emulation, a shout to their messianic&nbsp;journo idols,&nbsp;a plethora of newbie soccer fans in America, the UK and anywhere else a laptop can connect to a local wi-fi spot fall prey to their misuse and barbarism of all things football related and the written word.
O.K., maybe the ‘B’ word was a bit harsh, and maybe the whole ‘he who is without sin, cast the first stone’ ideology should hit a bit closer to home, yet the few and the proud, those who refuse to aimlessly destroy a chalkboard or snapshot a match review to cater to their strengths,&nbsp;continue to stand amazed at some of the published jargon that appears each day across the width and breadth of the Internet. Truly fascinating, but who to trust?

While I’ll never slate or scoff at those who pursue their passion or simply wish to better themselves through almighty practice, there seems to be a reoccurring theme among the up and coming, the wanna-be’s and even the snobbish as it pertains to football formations and tactics. As the <a href="http://www.zonalmarking.net/" target="_blank">Zonal Marking</a>‘s and <a href="www.guardian.co.uk/profile/jonathanwilson" target="_blank">Jonathan Wilson</a>‘s of the world continue to enlighten football fans with their other worldly views on ‘how things work’, the charlatans continue to emerge from underneath their day jobs to plop themselves in front of their MacBooks as overnight experts. The problem: the next Jonathan Wilson awoke this very morning deciding he’d like to write tactics and figured he would&nbsp;pursue this new venture with content and not contemplation.
While there continues to be nothing wrong with the pursuit of the Yankee dollar or the warm, cuddly feeling of seeing ones name in all those bright lights up on high, may we at least clear up one or two minor affairs as it pertains to the use of certain terminology?
First off, it’s no sin if you’re a football fan, passionate or lukewarm, to not be able to dissect and analyze a match as experts do for major publications. The implementation of tactics, the use of various formations and the chopping and changing conducted each and every weekend in the Premier League by experienced managers, in a sense, shouldn’t always be understood by Joe in Tucson. Managers in the Premier League and across Europe spend their entire lives studying the art of football, which makes it&nbsp;just fine&nbsp;if normal soccer fans can’t grasp the idea of&nbsp;if a 4-2-3-1 has advantages over a 4-4-2 and why.
Secondly, those random numbers interspersed with dashes in odd sequences do not define tactics. We may like to think it’s that simple, unfortunately, it really isn’t. Think for a second about your favorite band. Not the newest flavor of the week, but one with a decent enough catalog for the example. For the sake of the exercise, I’ll choose Radiohead.
A match of football that ends 3-1 in favor of your team is their most recent release, 2007’s In Rainbows. Easily accessible, straight forward, brilliant (for you) and definitely worth another listen, or, in your case, another viewing. No need to overly analyze anything, your team was simply better in every position.&nbsp;Their straightforward 4-4-2 was balanced and attack-minded enough to overcome their inferior opponent. They flowed through the full 90 without much resistance, think Arsenal at home in August v Blackpool.
The very next weekend, your team draws 2-2 away when things looked to be going smoothly. Let’s define the draw as 2000’s Kid A, same band, but something slightly different, a change in direction from 97’s OK Computer,&nbsp;worth a deeper look and in need of analysis. The manager chose to take a risk and play one up top with a five man midfield. Now is the time for you to consider how the lone striker fared v a central defensive pairing, or why specifically the five man mid couldn’t retain possession the way you thought they would. What were the assigned roles of the deep-lying midfielder?
This is tactics. Kid A was a brilliant mix of risk and reward.
Finally, your team loses the following week at home 1-0. This loss is 2003’s Hail to the Thief, a tricky outing, positives to be taken, but maybe something was amiss, just maybe the result of some misplaced ideas. While your team lost, they reverted back to the 4-4-2 formation from the first example and the 3-1 win. Wait, 4-4-2 worked earlier, what went wrong? Tactics will help to explain, Hail to the Thief was a transition record&nbsp;shaded in&nbsp;discord. The 4-4-2 may not have worked this time because of the assignments undertaken by the full backs to ‘stay at home’, thus creating little width in your side’s attack.
If you’re still following me, the point here simply stated is that a team’s&nbsp;formation can show you a broad view of how they set up and the shape they’ll attempt to keep throughout the match. Tactics are a more specific ‘scrape’ of the formation. If Carlo Ancelotti deploys Ashley Cole at left back in a 4-3-3, that’s a part of the formation. Using Cole’s abilities to get forward at pace and overlap Florent Malouda in midfield was a tactical choice made by Ancelotti.&nbsp;
Is the metaphor flawless in its execution? Probably not. But while students of the game we all are and strive to be, one should remember that formations can be obvious, tactics can be ambiguous. While it’s essential that the two key terms are defined and used with appropriation, it’s all a bit O.K. if you take the match as it comes. The illustration simply defines a point or two we should keep in mind when reading the latest dissertation from the recently converted. After all, to sit back and relax as the game unfolds in the manner you see fit unquestionably defines the meaning of being a football fan, just make sure you’ve got some Radiohead playing in the background.
Jesse Chula can be electronically flicked in the ear on Twitter <a href="http://twitter.com/jessechula" target="_blank">here</a>.

Football Tactics: Thom Yorke&#039;s Role in Radiohead&#039;s 4-5-1

Football Tactics: Thom Yorke&#039;s Role in Radiohead&#039;s 4-5-1 - World Soccer Talk

Football Tactics: Thom Yorke's Role in Radiohead's 4-5-1

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Following on from<a href="http://epltalk.com/suggestion-box-please-share-your-ideas-24652"> the Gaffer’s suggestion for articles</a> to use as resources one of the key elements of a Football match are the Tactics each team employs. Unfortunately for converts the terminology can be impenetrable – 4-4-2 &amp; 4-3-3 are just random numbers and with two teams lining up it can be hard to understand how it all works.
Football is the Beautiful game, just watch Berbatov’s second at the weekend for an example. However the aesthetic beauty is underlined by the strategic theme running through the game throughout. In Football, Managers are the top authority at a football club on a day-to-day basis and very rarely are results blamed on the coaching staff or the Chairman. One of the key tasks of the football manager is to select the tactics heading into each encounter. Here i will run down the choices that lie before him, the strengths and weaknesses of a formation so the next time you settle down for a match and see the teams line up you can confidently point out how you expect the match to fare.
<address>NB: This is a long one folks.</address>
 
First and foremost how do you read tactics, well you read them from the back forwards. That is to say a 4-4-2 has 4 men in defence 2 men in the centre 2 men at the sides. The same goes for the midfield and ‘up front’ are the 2 strikers. If we were to complicate it slightly a 4-1-4-1 would indicate that a striker has been sacrificed for a player between the midfield and defence. Though this would often just be referred to as a 4-5-1 but it gets you thinking about where the players are on the pitch.
Noted tactical writer Jonathan Wilson <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2009/sep/22/football-tactics-trends" target="_blank" rel="noopener">once said</a>:
<blockquote>“The history of tactics is the history of the manipulation of space”</blockquote>
It is that key word, ‘space’, that relates to football. With the ball at his feet in space most football players will be a danger to the opposition be it a winger with the time to pick out that inch perfect cross (<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qA1giH_nWnI&amp;feature=related" target="_blank" rel="noopener">David Beckham</a>), or be it the creative midfielder who only needs one pass to decimate a defence (<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iq_zRoGI5mA">Xavi</a> or <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jr4IRfEhlJI&amp;feature=related">Xabi</a> your choice) or even dare you let a striker turn into space and run at a defence (<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RtzMvPkdfuU" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Drogba</a>). Tactics are chosen to prevent and create those opportunities, here is an (incomplete) list of the main categories.
4 Man Defences:
 4-4-2: The missionary position of Football, the 4-4-2 has been around for a very long time. The key thing it brings is stability, a 4-4-2 is reliable in that you can cover the entire pitch twice. Centre backs are comfortably paired beside each other without having to drift out to each wing or to midfield unless in an emergency. The wingers have a defined role to take on the opposition full back and to follow him when he goes forward, for the full back the inverse applies. When two teams line up in a 4-4-2 the game is usually decided by who has the better players, space can be created between the two lines the 4 and the 4 for a midfielder to drift into and pick out one of his forwards or a winger to beat his man and deliver the devastating cross to either of the two strikers. The problem with 4-4-2 is it’s history, Managers have had years to work around it and it is by no means the dominant formation it once was. England have been criticised for their reliance on the 4-4-2 as most of their continental brethren have more ‘sophisticated’ systems (See Tottenham’s destruction in the first half in Switzerland). However a well implemented 4-4-2 can still be the most effective tactic on the given day (see England’s destruction of Bulgaria then Switzerland themselves).
 4-5-1: The most prevalent defensive formation. The 4-5-1 is built around the idea that if you have a large amount of players in midfield you can stop the opposition playing and it often works. By clogging up the middle of the park with players the ability for the more creative or pacey players to find space is hampered. In these situations the team is trying to not lose, by staying organised (ie not leaving your position) you can frustrate even the very best team and if you get a few chances on a counter attack – getting the ball forward quickly as the other team is out of position – you may even steal a victory. It is the seal of a quality manager if he can work his team around this formation to pick up wins regardless of this tactic, something Rafa Benitez failed to do.
 4-3-3: Ostensibly a more attacking formation you remove one man from Midfield to add to the strikers. However in reality it often works out that you have 3 players in central midfield one striker and 2 wingers. Technically you have 5 players in midfield but this is not to be confused with the 4-5-1. 4-3-3 and it’s variations are the tactic de jour. Seeing one striker toil away against two defenders has seen striker’s goals declining but an increase in goals scored by the wingers who leave their wing and move inside, that is towards goal rather than the corner flag, where they hope to get a shot away. The key proponent of this role is Leo Messi. He plays on the right of Barcelona’s front ‘three’ but as a left-footed player he moves towards goal on his stronger foot. An example of a modern 4-3-3 is Blackpool’s formation last year and this, apparently based on an Italian team&nbsp;Foggia’s rise in the early nineties who also depended on attacking to keep the opposition off balance.
The 4-3-3 also provides flexibility as you can change your roles easier when you are not in possession. Under Jose Mourinho when Chelsea lost the ball their ‘wingers’ would come back alongside their central midfielders and create the 4-5-1 mentioned above. This allowed Chelsea to be both attacking and extremely defensive but required a lot of their wingers.
The next tactic (though it looks complicated) is just a variation on this theme.
 4-2-3-1: The main tactic played by elite football teams at both club and international level. This formation is at it’s core a variation on a 4-3-3. The 2 are two defensive midfielders the 3 are the wingers – who come inside like above – and an attacking midfielder who is freed from the defensive duty a 4-4-2 or 4-3-3 imposes on him. Think Wesley Sneijder for Inter or Mesut Ozil for Germany when you think of this player. The problem is that when this formation meets another the game can get narrow as no team has true width and the left and right backs cannot go forward as they are met with the two wingers on each side of the -3- in that formation. This has led increasingly to left and right backs who are now just converted centre-backs. However against the 4-4-2 this formation is a killer. The attacking midfielder is free to range between the two lines of 4 and the opposition is nullified in attack by the two defensive midfielders. If a midfielder is brought back to cover the attacking midfielder this creates space for one of the two defensive midfielders to influence the game. Currently Chelsea at full-strength or Barcelona are the best at this style of play. Xavi and Iniesta are more skilful but Essien and Lampard are more powerful it would be quite the clash if these teams met at full strength in Europe this year.
 3 Men Defences:
<a href="http://epltalk.com/could-the-three-man-defense-work-in-england-24637" target="_blank" rel="noopener">As mentioned on this blog not long ago the 3 man defence is something rarely seen these days</a>. It was a useful tactic in the late seventies and early eighties but has died out recently bar the few teams who had the specialist players necessary to make it work (Cafu).
 3-5-2 – Whilst it is written like that the tactic is actually 3 centre halves two ‘wing-backs’ who sit between defense and midfield and 3 centre midfielders. The key to this tactic are those ‘wing-backs’ the only players who give natural width to the team. This tactic required these players to attack and defend which often meant running the length of the pitch in both directions in quick succession. It is due to the scarcity of those sorts of players in today’s quicker game that these formations have died out. Last used successfully by Roma under Capello and Celtic under Martin O’Neill, an attempt to use the same formation when he returned to England did not work out. Players with the engine’s of Ashley Cole and Gareth Bale may be able to make this formation work once more but it would be a risky move to try and revitalise this one.
 3-4-3 – This is a very attacking formation as the midfield already has natural width meaning that the 3 at the top is actually 3 strikers. It is very rare to see this formation but a variation on it was evident when Chile played at the World Cup. Chile were one of the most exciting teams at the tournament as their formation meant that they were consistently overnumbering their opposition in their half. This made it very difficult for teams to build attacks as they were constantly under pressure. If it were not for their wastefulness Chile would’ve garnered more attention in their opening game against Honduras. It was unfortunate that they met Brazil first in the kncok-out rounds but their insistance on attacking football was admirable.
5 Men Defences: 
 5-4-1: The ultimate in defensive football, recently displayed by Rangers at Old Trafford. When the teams were displayed it was obvious how this game was going to go. Rarely used in modern football except in a game where you want to keep the score respectable or are playing for the draw.
I hope the above has been useful to you as a new football fan, as an old hand it may be a bit rudamentary. However if this has wheted your appetite to discover more about tactics better writers than me are covering it in great detail. The always excellent<a href="http://www.zonalmarking.net/"> Zonal Marking</a> will break down interesting games from over the weekend to show how a single player or change can influence the game, similarly if the game was a bore you can see why. If you are so disposed that you want to read an entire book about football, <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Inverting-Pyramid-History-Football-Tactics/dp/0752889958" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Jonathan Wilson’s “Inverting the Pyramid</a>” is the bible of modern football tactics.
Finally, it is important to understand that tactics are not everything sometimes it takes a Berbatov or Ben Arfa strike to determine a game. Though don’t discount it either, Jose Mourinho didn’t get to where he was based on “always” having the best players at his disposal: his success at Porto was based on defence. Mourinho has usually bought the players to suit his system and not the other way around, Inters unbelievable display at the Camp Nou after Busquets’ cheating will go down in History as one of the greatest losses in Inter Milan’s history. Aesthically it was horrible as Inter kicked the ball away with no intent to play but tactically? It was beautiful.
<address>NB: If there is the appetite for it I could expand on most of the above. Just use the comments section below.</address>

The EPLtalk Beginner's Guide to Tactics

The EPLtalk Beginner's Guide to Tactics - World Soccer Talk

<a href="http://view.picapp.com/pictures.photo/sports/2010-world-cup-south/image/9154499?term=algeria" target="_blank"><div><figure class="external-image"><img loading="lazy" src="http://view3.picapp.com/pictures.photo/image/9154499/2010-world-cup-south/2010-world-cup-south.jpg?size=500&amp;imageId=9154499" border="0" width="500" height="333" alt="England&apos;s Wayne Rooney tries to stop Algeria&apos;s Rafik Djebbour (L) during the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa soccer match, Group C, England vs Algeria at Green Point football stadium in Capetown, South Africa on June 18, 2010. The match ended in a 0-0 draw. Photo by Henri Szwarc/Cameleon/ABACAPRESS.COM Photo via Newscom"></figure></div></a>
With the news that controversial match official Koman Coulibaly has received a rating of “poor” after his expedited evaluation following his shocking display in the now infamous United States – Slovenia draw and is likely to be relieved of his World Cup duties on Monday it’s time we shift our focus to the United States’ final opponents in the group stage: Algeria.
This match will be different for an Algerian side that were content to sit back and play for a draw in their previous matches, something they did successfully against England, and if not for a goalkeeping howler would’ve done against Slovenia. [For an extended explanation of this, check out the excellent <a href="http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/06/19/england-0-0-algeria-tactics/" target="_blank">Zonal Marking</a>.] This was done essentially by playing a seven-man midfield in-front off the bank of central defenders that protected the goalkeeper. Officially Algeria fielded a striker against England, Gladbach’s Karim Matmour, but he rarely contributed to the attack instead electing to stay back and help solidify the defensive effort. Algeria allowed their defensive wall slight breathers by sending wing-back Nadir Belhadj on barnstorming runs up the left hand side that exploited the gap occasionally left by Glen Johnson in England’s defense. This tactic will not work against the United States because unlike the other three teams, Algeria must win by multiple goals to advance.
Goal scoring has not been easy for Algeria in 2010, having only scored six times in eleven matches — three of which came against Cote d’Ivoire in a Cup of Nations match, with one being scored in extra time — so switching to an attacking formation will represent a seismic shift for the Desert Foxes. Much of the team’s attacking inspiration comes from Portsmouth man Belhadj who likes to fly up and down the left channel, as a result his forays forward could create holes in the Algerian defense that Bob Bradley should look to exploit using the pace of Landon Donovan or Clint Dempsey. The three center backs often deployed by Algeria are all in excess of six-feet which makes it difficult to win aerial challenges but may open the door for a “fox in the box” type player such as Herculez Gomes.
Regardless of their opponent’s lack of attacking prowess, the United States must amend a glaring hole in their offside trap that has thrice been exploited in this World Cup — twice for goals, and once by an Emile Heskey effort that forced the best out of Tim Howard. A failure to rectify this flaw could be taken advantage of by a good creative player, and Algeria has one in the form of Karim Ziani who plays in the Bundesliga for Wolfsburg.
Given Algeria’s focus on their spine this match could be an opportunity for the American wide players to prove their ability by getting balls in behind the Algerian wall to Altidore and either Gomes or Buddle, the latter two being in fine goal scoring form this year. It will be very important to test goalkeeper Rais M’Bohli often who despite his solid display against England has proven shaky at club level in the past.
This group has been anything but “easy” as predicted by an infamous British tabloid and the final ties of the group will show us the true quality of the teams involved.

USMNT: Moving On To Algeria

USMNT: Moving On To Algeria - World Soccer Talk

<div><figure class="external-image"><img loading="lazy" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-7192" src="/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/3235720989_1b44a1c694.jpg" alt="3235720989_1b44a1c694" width="230" height="172"></figure></div>
If you would believe various pundits, the annoying debate that many football fans have been subject to this year and last – Ronaldo vs. Messi – will come to its conclusion in the UCL final in Rome.&nbsp; On the biggest stage in club competitions, the two most complete players in attacking football will meet head to head.
The winner will be crowned the best in the world, the loser will claim second place.&nbsp; Fans of the loser will say he was robbed, the winner’s supporters will smugly proclaim that the final underscored the gulf in quality.
To boil the final down to this issue would be a mistake, and would ignore the other much more important battles that will happen on May 27th.&nbsp; While Ronaldo and Messi are both elite, I doubt the Champions League trophy will really go to whoever plays better on that day.
First of all, neither the Argentine nor the Portuguese has an impressive record against clubs from England and Spain, respectively.&nbsp; An injured Messi was pretty much ineffective against Barcelona last season in the semis, and Ronaldo was marked out of the game by Barcelona, notably Gianluca Zambrotta, who ironically teed up Paul Scholes for the long range, tie-winning goal.
This year in the final however, I see more of a Barcelona’s attack vs United’s back four.&nbsp; Vidic and Ferdinand, as it has been repeated so often, are the best two in the game.&nbsp; Evra looks to be back on form.&nbsp; The only suspect position, and I use that term only in comparison with the other members of the back-line, is right-back for United.
This is not to take away from the offense, but the free-flowing stuff of last season has been slowed down, maybe by Berbatov’s inclusion (didn’t the United vs. Arsenal meeting last week look like the 2007-08 campaign, with Berba notably on the bench?).&nbsp; This season the defense has really outshone the offense, not just in the club but in the whole EPL, 4-0 loss to Liverpool excluded.
Barcelona’s attack is frightening, but currently weakened.&nbsp; Henry and Iniesta both are having problems with fitness, Dani Alves and Eric Abidal (unfairly) are suspended, and Rafa Marquez is out for the season.&nbsp; These weaknesses in defense force makeshift changes and weaken the midfield, already less flowing and lethal when Iniesta has to play as a forward for the injured Henry.&nbsp; If neither Iniesta nor Henry play, Pep Guardiola will have to change his “Tridente” formation for the first time this season (or else play out-of-form Bojan or Gudjohnsen), which brings me to my next point.
Everyone playing Barca since late September has known that they will run a 4-3-3 with Messi on the right, Henry on the left, and Eto’o in the middle.&nbsp; The midfield will include Xavi, Iniesta, and Keita or Yaya Toure.&nbsp; Dani Alves plays at right back (in reality reality he is an attacking midfielder), Puyol and Marquez stay in the center, unless Pique plays in which case Puyol moves out left.&nbsp; It’s a formula, and it has worked, but against master tacticians, it won’t.&nbsp; It literally came within seconds from failure against Chelsea, but a combination of slack finishing, suspect calls, and a non-existant clearance from Essien allowed Iniesta one chance that he buried in style.&nbsp; Hiddink knew how to shut down Barcelona, and my bet is that Sir Alex will too.
The Scot should be able to field a United side that can take advantage of both the weakness in attack simply by keeping the defense as he has all season, and exploit Barcelona’s defense problems.&nbsp; The right and left wings will be open all night to&nbsp; players with pace now that Alves and Abidal are gone, and judging by the Chelsea game, the midfield looks like it can be muscled out by the likes of Carrick and Anderson.&nbsp; Most importantly, if Puyol moves out left or right, the center will be horribly exposed.
Barcelona are hobbling right now, and certainly cannot field a full strength team.&nbsp; Messi on his day is the best in the world, but he cannot make up for the obvious defensive weaknesses.&nbsp; If Iniesta and Henry do return for the final however, it might not matter how weak the defense looks.&nbsp; If Barca show up to Rome limping in both the attacking and defending third though, I feel that Sir Alex’s carefully planned team will be celebrating at the end of the night.

This Year's Champions League Final Will NOT Be Ronaldo vs Messi

This Year's Champions League Final Will NOT Be Ronaldo vs Messi - World Soccer Talk

<div id="attachment_4736" style="width: 510px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><div><figure class="external-image"><img aria-describedby="caption-attachment-4736" loading="lazy" class="size-full wp-image-4736" src="/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/481660827_2e35ff4118.jpg" alt="Bill Shankly: " football="" is="" a="" simple="" game="" based="" on="" the="" giving="" and="" taking="" of="" passes,="" controlling="" ball="" making="" yourself="" available="" to="" receive="" pass.="" it="" terribly="" simple.""="" width="500" height="395"></figure></div>Bill Shankly: "Football is a simple game based on the giving and taking of passes, of controlling the ball and of making yourself available to receive a pass. It is terribly simple."</div>
<blockquote>
And my particular bugbear, this week, is bullshit-artists who try to over-complicate a perfectly simple game by waffling on interminably about formations and tactics; holding midfielders, players in the hole, galloping wing-backs blah, blah, blah snooze yawn in a bid to make out they’re more clever than everyone else. There is, of course, a time for such talk, but as somebody clever once said about analysing humour, dissecting football to that degree is like dissecting a frog. Nobody is particularly interested and the frog dies.&nbsp; — Barry Glendenning.
</blockquote>
So wrote the <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/audio/2009/feb/26/football-weekly?commentid=aee6c082-9b24-4b22-a84f-8d8ff7643b76">Guardian scribe on the Football Weekly blog this week</a>, and I will boldly be the first to say I agree.
There is a latent fear in English football that unless you discuss a 3-0 top of the table thrashing by making several references to the demise of the 4-5-1 in favour of the 3-6-1, you are somehow part of the old, naive generation of English observers who regard pace, power and passion as the solution to any tactical defensive formation imaginable.&nbsp; On the continent of course, it has always been a humiliating shame to be considered “tactically-naive”; Bobby Robson learned this first hand managing PSV Eindhoven in the bad old days of the early 1990s when he observed, “An English pro accepts the manager’s decision. After every match here, the substitutes come and visit me.”&nbsp; Now the fear is that unless the game is reduced to a set of variable formulae, English football (specifically the national team) will remain a footballing backwater forever.
Of course, without intelligent formations and plans there would be no football, but it’s wrong to believe football is merely the sum of its tactical parts.&nbsp; Yet today Jonathan Wilson’s Inverting the Pyramid: A History of Football Tactics sells like hotcakes, and every fifteen year-old boy who’s won a few games on Football Manager posts up their opinions of Wenger’s use of attacking midfielders, with the firm belief that if only they’d been in Arsene’s place to option Vela as a lone striker, Arsenal would never have drew [fill in the the lower table underdog here].&nbsp; It’s considered conventional wisdom that tactics make the football and not vice-versa, and that’s led to an over-emphasis on the importance of the manager as the driving force of the game. Players are no longer considered capable of taking any on-pitch leadership, or of using their instincts and playing to their individual strengths by grasping a fleeting moment, brilliantly, to change a game midstream.
Bob Paisley once gave famously effective advice to Liverpool on the eve of their first European Cup against Moenchengladbach in Rome, 1977: none at all.&nbsp; His tactics, already quite familiar to his team, were merely the formations in which his individual players could best excel.&nbsp; Compare that to Rafa Benitez, who dithered his way out of a Champions League win in 2007 by missing the stupidly obvious: sending in Craig Bellamy to join lone striker Dirk Kuyt (!), so he could at least rough AC Milan up and wedge himself in the box as the game withered and died.
But the best contemporary example has to be Chelsea, whingeing about how Scolari didn’t “make” them train, didn’t “motivate” them by being tough on them, and was “too friendly.” The notion of individual responsibility has been eroded by the expectation that managers should have total control over their players.&nbsp; Tactics are an integral part of the sport, but they are only one part.&nbsp; Managers are not gods, and good tactics alone does not a good football club make.&nbsp; As Glendenning said, echoing Shankly before him, football is a simple game.&nbsp; Reducing it to tactics and formations alone makes it simplistic.

Tactics and the Modern Game: the Perils of Overstating the Case

Tactics and the Modern Game: the Perils of Overstating the Case - World Soccer Talk

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