The talk of the town these days in Manchester, at least in one half of the city, is about the next manager at Old Trafford. Will Van Gaal remain in the hot seat, or have Manchester United already agreed a deal with José Mourinho? Or, perhaps less likely, will they move for a third name — a Giggs, Pochettino, or Simeone?

But this question is not our concern here. Instead, we will focus on the team and what new players are required in order for Manchester United to take the next step and become genuine title contenders again. In truth, I am not sure that so much is needed as others like to claim.

People talk a lot about a world-class center forward (Ibrahimović, Lewandowski), but my suggestion would be to only go for three players, and among them I don’t count a center forward.

I agree with all those who say that a new center back is needed. Admittedly, Smalling and Blind have done very well this season, but Manchester United still need a center back for two reasons. While Blind has surprised many with some fine displays, it is still doubtful that center back is his best position. Apart from this, United need more numbers in that position, not least because Phil Jones’s United career may be over due to his endless injuries, and because Rojo, if he gets to stay, is better suited at left back. My choice would be Aymeric Laporte from Athletic Bilbao. John Stones and, especially, Rafael Varane, are obvious contenders, too, but I would choose Laporte because he is left footed. A few months ago, I would definitely have said Stones, but since then Van Gaal has managed to introduce more English players into his line-up. My concerns about the identity of the team are thus less today than then. This transfer – Laporte, or, if not him, then Varane or Stones – is indeed possible, and Manchester United should move early to secure the deal.

SEE MORE: Manchester United face a crossroads to decide between Mourinho and Van Gaal

The second player is more unlikely, but I am being driven more by the pleasure principle than the reality principle in this text. Bearing this in mind, I would go all in for Paul Pogba to bolster the midfield. With him, you get a player that will definitely be among the world’s best for the next several years and someone who can operate box to box. Pogba is a true number eight who will guarantee a lift in quality in any team through his goals, presence, and flair.

In attack, I would trust Rashford and Martial to share the responsibility of the number 9. If Rashford gets injured, if he suffers a drop in form, or if he needs a rest, Martial can be moved into the middle. My choice would then be to go for a winger, and Gareth Bale is the one Manchester United should attempt to lure to Old Trafford. He would bring speed, goals, and creativity, but also experience to a team that have grown younger in the second half of this season.

Of course, a lot of question marks also exist as to whom will be released or sold. Jones and Rojo have already been mentioned. Will Carrick be offered a new contract? Has Januzaj missed his opportunity? What about Pereira? Will Memphis get a chance to improve on his pretty miserable first season at Old Trafford? These are questions for the manager. Here below, I will show what my ideal starting 11 would look like in August 2016, and I believe it is a team with the right mixture of youth and experience, with a sufficiently strong bench, and, not least, a team good enough to compete for the title.

Substitutes:

Daley Blind, Antonio Valencia, Matteo Darmian, Guillermo Varela, Cameron Borthwick-Jackson, Morgan Schneiderlin, Michael Carrick, Marouane Fellaini, Ander Herrera, Juan Mata, Memphis Depay, Ashley Young, Jesse Lingard, Sergio Romero, Sam Johnstone, Adnan Januzaj, Andreas Pereira, James Wilson

The clouds looming above Old Trafford these days seem undecided. They just can’t make up their minds if they should open the floodgates, or if they should evaporate and let the sun start shining again.

Each time an opening into the paradise of Top 4 can be felt, Louis van Gaal’s Manchester United blow their chance. Recently, although the chronology was inverted, they only managed a draw against a Vardy-less Leicester team thus dropping two vital points, only for them to see Manchester City drop all three points against Southampton immediately after their own disappointing match. This has happened many a time this season. And as everybody knows, missing points are felt so much more intensely the closer you get to the final match day.

With only three games remaining, the chances of a Champions League spot look more and more out of Van Gaal’s reach, and that scenario would probably initiate the opening of the floodgates.

But the sunshine may in fact also still break through the clouds. One thing is certain: Manchester United are still in the hunt for a trophy this season. The FA Cup trophy can be in the horizon, and chances are – on paper at least – pretty good to win it. Crystal Palace at Wembley sounds manageable, but these cup-ties have a history of their own in terms of Davids cheating Goliaths. And as already mentioned, it is not impossible for Manchester United to actually break into Top 4. A Manchester City defeat at Arsenal would play the ball into United’s own court again.

But does all this matter if we turn our attention toward the main reason for the undecidedness of the clouds looming above Old Trafford, that is, the question of who will be in charge at Old Trafford next season? At one point, or, perhaps rather several points, during this season it seemed certain that Van Gaal would be released after the season. Champions League elimination after the group stages, losing in Denmark to FC Midtjylland, several drab (and goalless) performances in the league etc. Now there are signs pointing in the opposite direction, though. Signs such as the FA Cup Final at Wembley, the chance of Top 4, and, not least, glimpses of a kind of soccer that almost reminds one of the good old days under Sir Alex Ferguson – that is, speedy, attacking football with great emphasis on width. But only glimpses. And only few of them to be honest. West Ham away in the FA Cup, Crystal Palace at home in the league. The first fifteen minutes at home against Leicester, but then a collapse into the old Van Gaal mischiefs of sideways anti-penetration and anti-urgency soccer. And a couple of good results (but no spectacular soccer) such as away wins against Manchester City and Liverpool.

But perhaps we forget the most important reason for the possibility of Van Gaal actually remaining in Manchester for one more year and thus seeing out his initial three-year contract: his success with integrating a series of young (academy) players into the first team. Apart from the few glimpses of attacking and fluid soccer, the possible, yet increasingly unlikely Top 4 spot, and the chance of a trophy at Wembley, the sense of optimism surrounding Old Trafford these weeks mostly has to do with the future that some of these young players seem to promise the Old Trafford faithful. Not since 1995 when Sir Alex Ferguson introduced The Class of ’92 has there been a more talented group of youngsters at Old Trafford. The expensive buy Anthony Martial has been worth the money, and everybody seems to agree that he is a future world-class player. Jesse Lingard, whom Alex Ferguson predicted would come good when reaching the age of 22, has got his breakthrough this season. Teenage sensation Marcus Rashford took his chance when he got it, and even though one should always be careful with players so young and with so few games under their belt, it also seems as if fans and experts are sure of his ability to stay on top. The label ‘future world class’ has also been heard about Rashford already. Manchester United’s three front men are thus aged 20, 22 and 18. But there are more examples if we move further back the pitch. Late in the season, Timothy Fosu-Mensah, a fellow Dutch to Van Gaal, broke into the team and impressed everybody with a series of assured performances at both left, right and center back. Before him, it was Guillermo Varela from Uruguay who played impressively well at right back, while Cameron Borthwick-Jackson copied him at left back.

So, who will be in charge at Old Trafford next season? It is a tough question to answer. Perhaps it is only Ed Woodward and Manchester United’s board who know the answer to that question. Maybe even they don’t know the answer. But if that is the case, they will soon have to make up their mind. Will a Top 4 spot save Van Gaal from being released a year too soon? Will a FA Cup trophy be enough to save him? How much impact will his success with the youngsters have on the board’s decision? Can the endless list of injuries – a truly horrible list, and a list including Luke Shaw who was showing signs in the beginning of the season of challenging David de Gea as Manchester United’s most valuable player – help the Iron Tulips case?

Personally, I will refrain from making too bold claims. When Manchester United appointed David Moyes, I went with the nostalgics and proclaimed that the signing made sense. Well, it didn’t. When Van Gaal replaced Moyes, I said the same thing. It made sense. Van Gaal had what Moyes didn’t have: a record of trophies. He even emulated Sir Alex Ferguson in terms of youth development. And, perhaps most importantly, he shared with Sir Alex the unbelievable triumph of leading an underdog to the title (AZ Alkmaar, Aberdeen). What could go wrong? Well, as the last two seasons and hundreds of millions of dollars later have shown, a lot has actually been going wrong. Regression instead of progression table-wise. Regression instead of progression soccer-wise. A list of buys not worth the money (Angel Di Maria, Marcos Rojo, Radamel Falcao). A list of talented players not developing (Adnan Januzaj, Andreas Pereira, James Wilson).

But there are signs of progress and signs warranting optimism. If some of the most promising talents are not being given a chance, others have been developing, some even with explosive pace. And if some buys have been disappointing, others have been impressive. Daley Blind’s development as a central defender this season is one example. Martial’s introduction to the Premier League is a fairy tale. The discovery of Rashford could be a new “Patrick Kluivert” by Van Gaal. And isn’t there signs of these youngsters beginning to influence the soccer style of Manchester United in the right direction? If so, and bearing in mind the history of Manchester United, wouldn’t it be too rash to invite José Mourinho into the hot seat at Old Trafford and risk destroying the youth development by Warren Joyce, Nicky Butt, Ryan Giggs, and Louis van Gaal? Will Manchester United’s board be willing to miss out on yet another Champions League season in order to see what Van Gaal can actually do with these kids next season?

As I said, I will refrain from making any bold statements. Too often too many experts have too many opinions. In the end, it will be Ed Woodward and Manchester United’s board who will make the decision. We will soon learn what they decide. In the meantime, let’s enjoy the rest of the season – and congratulate Leicester with their miraculous title.

Søren Frank is the author of a book about Manchester United entitled Standing On The Shoulders Of Giants. The book was recently reviewed by World Soccer Talk.

Out of all of the clubs in the Premier League, Manchester United is the one that has won the most silverware and, therefore, poses the biggest challenge in picking a best starting XI of all time from its plentiful list of world-class footballers.

While there’ll be debate about who has been left out of this starting XI, the 11 footballers featured below certainly are deserving of a place in this all-time Manchester United team.

Here’s the best starting eleven of all time for Manchester United:

Goalkeeper: Peter Schmeichel (Denmark)

For me, there are only two keepers who contend to be among the best ever eleven starters for Manchester United. One is Dutch Edwin van der Sar. The other is Danish Peter Schmeichel. If David de Gea is to be counted among the Old Trafford elite, he needs to win trophies, reproduce his current form over a longer period, and settle down in Manchester for more seasons. Schmeichel gets the nod from me because I consider him more important and also better overall than Van der Sar. Schmeichel was bought for almost nothing by Alex Ferguson and played a pivotal role in the club’s rise to prominence in the 1990s. Schmeichel excelled in the one to one duels with opponent strikers and he owned the penalty box due to his physical and vocal presence. He cut an imposing figure and often won the psychological battles against his opponents, some of whom freezed in front of The Great Dane. Schmeichel crowned an impressive Old Trafford career with lifting the trophy after that memorable Champions League final against Bayern Munich in 1999, the year the club won The Treble. He was twice crowned the best goalkeeper in the world.

Right back: Gary Neville (England)

There are several criteria that influence my decision on who to include in the best-ever Manchester United eleven. One is club longevity and loyalty, titles, and caps. In that sense, Gary Neville is up there among the best, not just in the history of Manchester United. He developed into a modern full back with a great positional sense, a decent technique, and a mind to attack. Neville also had speed, he could cross the ball, and he was a good tackler. His understanding on the right with David Beckham was a classic partnership in which both knew how to complement each other.

Right central defender: Rio Ferdinand (England)

Rio Ferdinand was one of the best cultured defenders in world soccer. He had a long and successful career including many trophies at Old Trafford. His major strengths were his elegance and passing skills, his physical presence and vision, and his composure.

Left central defender: Charlie Roberts (England)

This one is also tricky. Nemanja Vidic is the obvious modern choice. Steve Bruce is also a contender. Bill Foulkes, the Munich survivor, another. But I choose Charlie Roberts from Ernest Mangnall’s first Manchester United championship winning team in the first decade of the twentieth century. Ghost in Boots, he was nicknamed, because of his physical appearance. Vittorio Pozzo, the legendary Italian coach who won two World Championships with Italy, called him the best player in the world after he saw him in Manchester. The story even goes that Pozzo changed the old 2-3-5 Pyramid formation into the more flexible 2-3-2-3 Metodo formation because Roberts revolutionized soccer with his dynamic style. Roberts was also a political figure in soccer and fought for players’ rights in establishing a players’ union.

Left back: Patrice Evra (France)

At left back, I think it becomes trickier. I promised myself that the present should not necessarily have an advantage over the past just because our memory tends to be weak and forgetful. Roger Byrne, the first babe, captain of the Busby Babes, and a casualty of the Munich Air Disaster was for me a candidate from the 1950s, so was the ever-reliable Denis Irwin from the 1990s, but I still believe that Patrice Evra deserves to be in the team. Evra suffered a difficult start to his United career, but after a couple of months he never looked back. His strengths were above all his attack-minded raids on the left, his physical aggression, his technical skill, and his leadership qualities. Even more than Neville, Evra was a modern full back.

Defensive midfielder: Duncan Edwards (England)

There are a few players in my team who are untouchables. Edwards is one of them. He could probably play as one of the central defenders as well, but I chose to put him in midfield where his dynamism can best be utilized. Edwards is a true legend, not just because he was one the Munich casualties, but also because he was – and still is – considered one of the best English players ever – if not the best. He was quite simply a nuclear plant on the pitch, a powerhouse who was also gifted with a great shot, a decent technique and excellent heading abilities. Edwards is the reason why otherwise automatic choices such as Roy Keane and Bryan Robson are left out of my starting eleven.

Offensive midfielder: Bobby Charlton (England)

Again, the obvious modern choice would be Paul Scholes, but I also have an obligation toward history. If anyone is the embodiment of Manchester United, it is Sir Bobby Charlton. European Player of the Year in 1966, World Cup winner in 1966, and European Cup winner in 1968, until recently holder of the club record in appearances, survivor of the Munich Air Crash, and Busby Babe. Charlton was a gifted midfielder, who had a powerful shot and great technical abilities. Mr. United, no need to say more.

The selection doesn’t get easier, but here is another untouchable. European Footballer of the Year in 1968, George Best played a key role in Matt Busby’s hunt for the Holy Grail with his performance in the European Cup final victory at Wembley against Benfica. The fifth Beatle, Best was a pop icon as well as a soccer super star (as was an early contender for this position, Charlie Roberts’ teammate Billy Meredith, as well as a later contender, David Beckham), and he is probably the most gifted player ever on the British Isles. Best is a true United player, attack minded, technically gifted, and with a demonic personality – his brothers in that sense are players such as Roy Keane, Eric Cantona, and Wayne Rooney.

Roaming striker: Eric Cantona (France)

The catalyst behind Manchester United’s transformation from title contenders to genuine and multiple champions, Alex Ferguson’s French talisman is such an important player in the modern history of Manchester United. He had the touch of brilliance like Best, and like him he also had the occasional demonic behavior. Cantona’s presence and technical abilities helped educate the Class of ’92 and pave the way for the United success many take for granted today.

Striker: Denis Law (Scotland)

Another European Player of the Year (1964), Denis Law belongs to Matt Busby’s Holy Trinity (Best-Charlton-Law) and played a key part in Busby’s entertaining team of the mid-60s. Law was a prolific goal scorer. His major strengths were his ability to be at the right place at the right moment as well as his heading abilities and shooting skills. He was brought back to England from Torino by Busby a couple of years after the Munich Disaster and helped transform Busbys Manchester United into the best team in Europe.

Left midfielder: Cristiano Ronaldo (Portugal)

The last untouchable in my team, the name of Ronaldo at this moment also means that I couldn’t find room for neither Ryan Giggs nor Wayne Rooney. One could say that my choice to not let the present dominate by bringing in players such as Roberts, Edwards, Charlton, and Law is the reason why I haven’t been able to accommodate players such as Scholes, Keane, Beckham, Giggs, Mark Hughes, and Rooney into my team. But Ronaldo is probably the best player ever to have worn the Red Devils jersey. He had six seasons, two of which were exceptional out-of-the-world-seasons, at Old Trafford and was crowned the best player in the world in 2008 after leading Manchester United to Champions League glory. Together with Best, Charlton, and Law, Ronaldo is the only United player to have received the Ballon d’Or. For that reason alone, they all deserve a place in my team.

If one takes a closer look at the list of players bought by Louis van Gaal during his time as manager at Old Trafford (see below), one thing must start to worry a lot of Manchester United supporters, especially the British ones, but perhaps also those of us who were born before soccer became a full-fledged transnational and globalized entertainment industry – that is, in the time before it became politically incorrect to speak of national traditions and stereotypes and before the implosion of the nation-state.

2014/15

Luke Shaw
Ander Herrera
Marcos Rojo
Daley Blind
Angel Di Maria
Radamel Falcao

2015/16

Memphis Depay
Matteo Darmian
Bastian Schweinsteiger
Morgan Schneiderlin
Sergio Romero
(Anthony Martial)

But why worry? It’s because of the growing imbalance between foreign players and British (and Irish) players at Manchester United.

Historically, Manchester United have been a club of extremes, the extreme of extremes even, but at the same time also a club upholding a precarious balance between these extremes. One example is the simultaneous existence of severe, sometimes even fatal rupture (bankruptcy, Luftwaffe bombings, air disaster, American ownership) and unheard of continuity (Matt Busby’s 25 years, Alex Ferguson’s 27 years, Bobby Charlton’s 758 matches during a 20-year career, Ryan Giggs’s 963 matches during a 24-year career). Another would be the club’s strong roots in the local, working class, industrial North and its pioneering European adventures in the 1950s that have disseminated into the global appeal associated with Manchester United today. A third example is the club’s tradition of mixing British players with foreign ones.

For every Jesper Olsen, Manchester United had a Gordon Strachan. For every Ronaldo, a Rooney. For every Yorke, there was a Cole. For every Eric Cantona, a Mark Hughes. Today, Daley Blind is complemented by Chris Smalling. Matteo Darmian by Luke Shaw. But here it apparently stops if we take Van Gaal’s transfer strategy seriously. Shaw is the only British player bought during his reign, and the Dutchman has bought 11 players so far. He has, on top of this, released several British players brought up the United way at the club’s famous academy. The latest casualty was Jonny Evans, but before him Van Gaal sold Darren Fletcher and, controversially, Danny Welbeck.

I am not saying that these goodbyes were wrong. But what must start to look more and more worrying for a lot of United fans is the imbalance between foreigners and English players at Old Trafford. Manchester United have a history of providing the backbone of the English national team – Bryan Robson, Paul Ince, Rio Ferdinand, Gary Neville, David Beckham, Paul Scholes, Wayne Rooney etc. Today, only Wayne Rooney (and perhaps Luke Shaw) can be considered regular United starters for the Three Lions. It may be that Chris Smalling and Phil Jones, especially the former, are beginning to establish themselves, but both were identified by Ferguson, not Van Gaal. Even Shaw was identified by David Moyes before Van Gaal replaced the Scot, and Van Gaal only sanctioned the transfer. Who knows who he would have gone for if he had had the time himself?

Alex Ferguson, and before him Ron Atkinson, used to identify the best British talent, and when they saw someone who stood out, either someone already established or someone with extraordinary talent – Bryan Robson, Wayne Rooney – they went for him.

Louis van Gaal and Ed Woodward have identified several positions where Manchester United needed strengthening. At right back, they could have gone for Nathaniel Clyne or Seamus Coleman, instead they opted for Matteo Darmian (who has had a very convincing start at Old Trafford, but that is not the point here).

As a winger Van Gaal put faith in his countryman Memphis Depay. He looks like a coming superstar. But Manchester United could have gone for Raheem Sterling. Recently, Van Gaal talked about Marouane Fellaini as his alternative striker this season. Most fans would probably want Ed Woodward to push hard for Harry Kane to partner Rooney up front.

Arsène Wenger once said that nationality meant nothing to him (even though the French majorities at Arsenal during Wenger’s reign suggests otherwise). With the arrival of Roman Abramovich at Chelsea, a long list of quickly bought foreign stars disrupted the balance at Stamford Bridge between British and international players. At San Siro, fans often saw Internazionale play with eight or nine Argentinians.

But Manchester United used to be different. Like FC Barcelona and Real Madrid, Manchester United’s teams were always characterized by a strong core of national players – the best of them – and three of four foreign superstars. Rooney and Ronaldo, Ferdinand and Vidic, Neville and Evra. Before that, Keane and Veron, Cole and Cantona, Irwin and Stam.

Admittedly, Manchester United still have a core of English players – Rooney, Carrick, Young, Shaw, Smalling, Jones – but it is gradually being undermined by the influx of foreign players. One English player and ten foreign players is an imbalance worth problematizing.

Ed Woodward needs to step up his interest in Gareth Bale, Harry Kane, and John Stones. If Manchester United’s ambition is to be among the very best, the club of course need the best players from around the globe. But Manchester United also need to maintain their English identity and tradition for balance, and in order to do that they need the best British players.

Van Gaal and Ferguson both made their names by promoting youth. Van Gaal’s Ajax may even have inspired Ferguson to promote the likes of Beckham, Scholes, Neville, and Giggs. Perhaps it is time for Ferguson’s nationally balanced teams to inspire Van Gaal?

During the summer of 1995, Sir Alex Ferguson showed his ruthless streak in the most brutal and to many fans and experts alike also surprising way when he got rid of three of his most important players from the previous season — Mark Hughes, the club icon educated in the club’s own academy, Paul Ince, the combative midfield warrior, and Andrei Kanchelskis, the speedy Ukrainian winger who had just ended the previous season as Manchester United’s top scorer.

The rest is history, as we used to say. On the first match day of the 1995/1996 season, Manchester United lost 3:1 to Aston Villa away from home. As replacements for the discarded stars, Ferguson had brought in youngsters such as Gary and Phil Neville, Nicky Butt, Paul Scholes, and David Beckham. Beckham scored United’s consolation goal, but the loss made the former Liverpool defender now TV pundit Alan Hansen say the famous line “You’ll never win anything with kids.” Alex Ferguson and Manchester United went on to win the Premier League that same season, and the team went on to dominate the league for years.

But if Manchester United fans believed that Sir Alex was only following in the footsteps of his compatriot Sir Matt Busby, the Scottish manager who led Manchester United into Europe and modernity in the 1950s and 1960s through a commitment to youth, Ferguson was also inspired by someone else – someone further away geographically, but closer historically.

In May 1995, Louis van Gaal had sensationally led Ajax to triumph in the European Champions League beating mighty AC Milan 1:0 in the final. The victory was sensational not only because it was David’s fight against Goliath, but also – and especially – because Van Gaal’s Ajax team had an average age of 23. Dominating the team were young players such as Edwin van der Sar, Michael Reiziger, Clarence Seedorf, Edgar Davids, and Patrick Kluivert, the 18-year old match winner in the final.

Alex Ferguson has often spoken about the legacy of Matt Busby and Manchester United’s tradition of youth, but he has also admitted that part of the inspiration behind trusting the Class of ’92 came from Van Gaal’s success with his kids in May 1995.

During the summers of 2014 and 2015, Manchester United could be said to have abandoned the long-standing tradition of youth by spending close to £300 million, mostly on established stars such as Angel Di Maria, Radamel Falcao, and Juan Mata, and most people, fans and experts alike, probably even Van Gaal himself, still believe it absolutely necessary to secure a world-class center back and a proven or very talented striker. Perhaps a goalkeeper, too.

It is hard not to agree. But it was also impossible for Alan Hansen in 1995 to believe that Manchester United could win anything with kids. It was impossible for people to imagine that Ajax could beat AC Milan the same year.

In all likelihood, it is going to be an impossible task for Louis van Gaal and Manchester United to challenge Chelsea with the current squad. But what if the summer of 2015 turns out to be a repeat of 1995? Remember what Bastian Schweinsteiger, the experienced German and World Cup winner, said when he had seen the new United kids in training? “I have seen a lot of young players in my career and I have to say that these young players are very, very good.”

Everyone knows that friendlies are not to be trusted, but still, the performance of Manchester United against FC Barcelona on the recent US tour, especially by some of the youngsters such as Depay, Pereira, Lingard, Shaw, and Januzaj, must have been very encouraging for Van Gaal.

My point is that habit – our innate propensity for the easy solution, for the secure path, for the obvious truth – makes us believe that Manchester United are in dire need of reinforcements. Maybe the argument is even rational. But sometimes, newness emerges unexpected and legends are created. That happened in 1995 with Ajax and Manchester United and with players such as Kluivert, Seedorf, Davids, Beckham, Scholes, and Gary Neville. Today, the Ajax manager of then is the Manchester United manager of now. Manchester United’s history proves that a gamble on youth can eventually be repaid tenfold; the same applies to Van Gaal’s history.

Is it possible to imagine that Van Gaal’s methods, his commitment to developing young players (at least those who can submit themselves to his “philosophy”), will start to pay its dividends at Old Trafford this season? Could it be that players like Smalling and Jones will finally transform themselves this season from (eternally) promising talents to established and truly reliable, perhaps even classy and dominant, center backs and thus step out of the shadow of Ferdinand and Vidic? And could it be that youngsters such as Januzaj, Pereira, Shaw, McNair, Blackett, and Lingard – or at least two or three of them – will have their breakthrough season and become vital cogs in the Van Gaal collective? As things stand now, Manchester United and Louis van Gaal need this to happen if they want to challenge Mourinho’s Chelsea.

As I see it, three things can happen.

1) Ed Woodward brings in a couple of more signings (and Pedro doesn’t count since he will be a direct replacement for Di Maria), for example a world-class central defender and a very good striker. Everybody expects it, not least the fans. Manchester United will then end the season as champions or runners up.

2) Or else Woodward doesn’t bring in more players. The above mentioned talents don’t show the much hoped for development, and Manchester United will end the season as number two, three or four.

3) Or, finally, no more players are signed, but the talents do in fact show the much hoped for development, and Manchester United will end the season as champions or runners up.

I bet the third option, the fairy tale option repeating 1995, would be the one most fans would love – also those who now demand more reinforcements.

Some numbers in soccer are iconic at certain clubs. Gradually, and often over the course of several decades, these numbers have grown in significance. Admittedly, there may be a few lacunae or outright failures disturbing the otherwise smooth rise to prominence, but they are never enough to question the iconicity of the specific number in case. On the contrary, it is as if the failures only contribute to heighten the importance of the number, making it all the more important to get it right with the next player wearing the famous jersey.

In the history of Manchester United, the most iconic number is without a doubt number 7. Yes, Duncan Edwards wore the number 6 jersey, and Ryan Giggs has played his part in making number 11 a coveted number. Back in 1960s, Denis Law often wore number 10 when he excited the fans at Old Trafford and became European Player of the Year in 1964.

But a long list of formidable legends has made sure that number 7 is the most prestigious number to wear if you are a Red Devil. In the beginning of the 20th century, soccer’s first super star Billy Meredith made the number into something special when he performed his Welsh wizardry on the right flank for Ernest Mangnall’s first Manchester United championship winning team. The next true legend to wear it was George Best, and then came Bryan Robson, Eric Cantona, David Beckham, and Cristiano Ronaldo.

Players such as Johnny Berry and Steve Coppell are other prominent names to have worn the jersey at Old Trafford, but they don’t quite fit the bill of true legend.

Sir Alex Ferguson signaled very clearly what he thought of the young Cristiano Ronaldo when he chose to give him number 7 after Beckham. Remember, this was a time when “Ronaldo” was almost synonymous with the Brazilian striker of that name, and remember too that the Old Trafford faithful expected Ronaldinho to become Beckham’s replacement.

When Ronaldo left Manchester United for Real Madrid, the number 7 jersey was vacant for a while. Ferguson hoped he had done some shrewd business when he snapped up the former Liverpool striker Michael Owen on a free transfer. With Owen’s track record of goals, Ferguson not only thought he had secured Manchester United a lot of goals, he also thought Owen could shoulder the burden of wearing the number 7 jersey after Cantona, Beckham, and Ronaldo. Neither really went as Ferguson had hoped.

After a couple of good seasons on the right wing, Antonio Valencia – Van Gaal’s preferred right back last season – decided to step up to the challenge and swapped his number 25 with the number 7. After one season he swapped back, having played badly, perhaps even miserable at times.

One year ago, most Old Trafford faithfuls thought the club had finally nailed it when Manchester United signed Angel di Maria for a British record fee of £59.7 million and they saw him inherit the number 7 jersey after his now former Real Madrid teammate Cristiano Ronaldo. Initially, it seemed to be the perfect continuation of the tradition of talismanic players wearing the number 7 at Old Trafford. But only initially. Before half the season was completed, Di Maria’s decline had begun.

Several factors were behind this. For one, Di Maria’s preferred destination last year was Paris Saint Germain, but FIFA Fair Play rules prevented the mega rich French club from buying the Argentinian. Perhaps the collapsed move and the lure of Paris, the City of Light, sedimented into Di Maria’s subconsciousness and from there constantly simmered until it boiled over some time during the spring. Another reason was the attempted burglary at his house while he and his family were present. This nasty experience clearly unsettled Di Maria to an extent from which he never recovered as a footballer while wearing the United kit. A third factor is Van Gaal’s difficulty of finding the best position for Di Maria – perhaps we could even say he mismanaged him, not only with his failure to find the best position for him, but also with his rigid and systematic way of “thinking” soccer. The Argentinian is arguably more intuition than rationality, and he was thus one of the casualties of the Van Gaal brain revolution at Old Trafford.

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However, if there is one thing that Van Gaal cannot be accused of it is obscurity when it comes to communicating with his players, both when it comes to tactical matters and matters of their future role. Van Gaal had thus made it clear to Di Maria what he expected of him if he was to re-establish himself in Van Gaal’s starting eleven. Van Gaal had also accepted that if Di Maria decided to leave, then Manchester United should let him leave. In other words, the ball was in Di Maria’s court. He had some decisions to be made. Would he be willing to adapt to the Iron Tulip’s much hyped “philosophy”? And would he stay in Manchester? In both cases, Van Gaal indicated the answers should come from Di Maria.

The way Di Maria has chosen to answer Van Gaal is through silence and by going AWOL. At one point Van Gaal frankly admitted that he simply didn’t know where Di Maria was when the Argentinian had failed to link up with the Manchester United squad in the US after his prolonged vacation due to his participation in the Copa America. Recently, he then showed his face for the first time in weeks when he arrived in Qatar for his PSG medical. Among the disgusted Manchester United fans jokes were floating around on the Internet about Di Maria not passing the medical because his lack of a spine.

United fans are right to be disgusted by the Argentinian. His behavior is disgraceful and childish – and could perhaps even be seen as a modern disease in the sport. Di Maria will go down as the worst number 7 in Manchester United’s history, even worse than Owen and Valencia, because the expectations were never that high with Owen and Valencia. But in Di Maria’s it is not even his failure to live up to the enormous expectations on the pitch.

Radamel Falcao also failed in that sense. But the Colombian kept trying, whereas the Argentinian gave up – first visibly on the pitch, and now invisibly by going into hiding. Van Gaal had more or less made it Di Maria’s own decision. Di Maria didn’t have the guts to tell the Dutch manager his decision face to face. He didn’t have the decency to report back for duty and link up with the teammates who had supported him during a difficult year in Manchester. Di Maria’s shameful departure from Old Trafford will ensure him a red hot and devilish welcome if he ever returns. In soccer, people may forget quickly, but Di Maria has ensured himself a legacy – at least among the Old Trafford faithful – as the unmanly coward and as the player unworthy of wearing the number 7 jersey.

Is the number cursed after the anonymity and failure of Owen, Valencia, and Di Maria respectively, or have they only contributed to making it even more iconic. Soon, perhaps, we will learn who will inherit Cantona’s and Ronaldo’s – and Di Maria’s – number at Old Trafford.

The arrivals of Bastian Schweinsteiger and Morgan Schneiderlin plus Louis van Gaal’s thinly disguised admiration for Michael Carrick seem to have resulted in a slight, but nevertheless significant tweaking of the Dutch Iron Tulip’s favored 4-3-3 formation.

Another factor behind the tweak, somewhat more surprising than the abovementioned arrivals, is Memphis Depay, the Dutch winger whom Van Gaal has been employing centrally as a number 10 behind the striker.

If journalists during Manchester United’s recently completed US tour reported back to the European continent that Van Gaal in every match had opted for a 4-2-3-1 formation, the Dutch “trainer coach” (Van Gaal’s own favorite expression) insists that he has employed a 4-3-3 formation and even referred to the formation as the one his team used in the second half of last season.

For a man so obsessed with shape, form, and detail, he should know better though. The journalists were actually correct when referring to Manchester United’s US tour formation as a 4-2-3-1. Of course, Van Gaal is not in fault when he calls this formation a 4-3-3 (he sees the number 10 as part of the midfield), but he is wrong when he defines it similarly to the 4-3-3 he used in the spring of 2015. And the small but important difference between the two formations seems to hit Ander Herrera, one of the success stories of last season’s revival, the most.

But let’s look into the two formations in order to better understand the difference. If we begin at the back, there is no difference in regard to the goalkeeper position and only minor differences in terms of the defense line. Both formations employ two center backs and two full backs. The same story applies if we move to the attacking line: more or less no difference. Two wingers who operate rather widely flank one central striker.

The main difference is found in midfield where the triangle is inverted so to speak. That is, instead of operating with one defensive and two offensive midfielders, Van Gaal has – mainly as a result of the arrival of Schweinsteiger and Schneiderlin – opted to operate with two defensive and one offensive midfielders. Before he had a distinctive number 6 plus two midfielders who floated between number 8 and 10. Now he plays with a distinctive number 10 and two midfielders who float between number 6 and 8.

The point is that Ander Herrera is neither an obvious number 6 nor an obvious number 10. His best position is as a number 8. Van Gaal doesn’t regard him as strong as Carrick, Schweinsteiger and Schneiderlin in the number 6 role, and so far the Dutchman has employed the more attack-minded Depay in the number 10 role.

This is bad news for Herrera – and it is also bad news for Marouane Fellaini. But especially for Herrera, I would argue. Why? Because Herrera had his breakthrough at Old Trafford during the second half of last season, a period during which he showed he had the potential to be the next Paul Scholes at Old Trafford. True, Fellaini also had some good games and scored some important goals, but most fans of Manchester United still don’t regard him as a true United player and were probably expecting him to be one of the first casualties of Van Gaal’s and Ed Woodward’s summer transfer activity.

Louis Van Gaal’s “old” 4-3-3:

Louis Van Gaal’s “new” 4-3-3:

The tweaking of the 4-3-3 formation also means that the very successful triangles of last season – Blind-Fellaini-Young on the left and Valencia-Herrera-Mata on the right – will now not only depend on different names but also depend on different positions.

One very important new partnership will be the understanding and interplay between the number 10 and the number 9, between Depay and Wayne Rooney. If United’s lone striker during last season (Rooney, Robin Van Persie, or Radamel Falcao) was more isolated or at least had his points of orientation split between the two number 8s, this season he will have closer and more obvious company because Van Gaal will employ a distinctive number 10. The successful triangles of last season will then be a little more defensive this year. They will still consist of the full back and the winger, but the midfielder is no longer one of the two offensive midfielders (Herrera or Fellaini), but one of the two defensive ones (Carrick, Schweinsteiger or Schneiderlin).

Van Gaal’s new 4-3-3, the 4-2-3-1, is a formation that most United fans like. It guarantees the most beloved width, both in terms of attacking full backs and wide wingers, and it promises exciting and creative patterns of attacking soccer with the partnership between the number 9 and 10. But Van Gaal’s insistence of employing Juan Mata on the right of United’s attacking line may baffle some fans and prevent the more traditional wing play of United’s right side. And his decision to use Depay centrally, a player who became top scorer of the Dutch Eresdivisie from his position on the left wing, may also surprise some fans. When the Dutchman chooses to employ wingers and a distinctive number 10, most fans would probably have opted to move Mata into his preferred number 10 role and employ Depay on the wing. But regardless of the specific positions of Depay and Mata, Ander Herrera has a right to be disappointed with Van Gaal’s tweaking of his 4-3-3 formation. Of course the season is long, Manchester United will probably play more games than last year, and Van Gaal may re-tweak his system yet again, but so far it looks as though Herrera will – to the regret of many United fans because of the Spaniard’s Scolesian qualities – be the biggest loser.

If Van Gaal is still intensely occupied by contemplating which striker, central defender, and goalkeeper to buy, in midfield his main concern is now who to drop from the team.

My guess is that most Manchester United fans are celebrating these days.

Why? Because Bastian Schweinsteiger has become a Manchester United player. He thus contributes strongly to Louis van Gaal’s rebuilding of the team, a rebuilding most fans probably had hoped was more underway than the end of last season showed it to be.

In spite of buying six new players worth $230.000.000, it was obvious that Manchester United were still in need of new quality players in central positions.

With the purchase of the winger Memphis Depay, the club continues a strong tradition of Dutch quality from PSV Eindhoven (Jaap Stam, Ruud van Nistelrooy, Park Ji-sung). And even though Depay is young, there are signs indicating that he could be an instant hit: speed, goals, dribbles, and physique to mention just a few of his key competences.

The transfer of Matteo Darmian also looks promising. Darmian may be a relatively unknown card, and United fans may also be a bit concerned about the national balance of the team, but Darmian has been impressive for both AC Torino and Italy for the past two seasons. Like Depay, he is a pure Van Gaal decision (that is, not a leftover from the Moyes era), and judging from the Dutch manager’s previous career, he has had a pretty good idea with the transfers he has made.

This brings us to the recently announced deal between Bayern Munich and Manchester United involving midfield maestro Bastian Schweinsteiger. He is not only a pure Van Gaal decision but also a sort of Van Gaal invention. After all, it was Van Gaal who transformed Schweinsteiger into a holding midfielder in 2009.

My intention in this article is double. First, the article is about Bastian Schweinsteiger. Second, the three most recent transfers give rise to a general reflection on three types of transfers to Old Trafford – three types because they involve three different horizons of time.

But first Schweinsteiger. As already mentioned, his arrival will probably cause some celebrations among United fans. And with good reason, I believe. He is as I said a transfer sanctioned by Van Gaal and also “invented” by him. That in itself is a good start. But if we look closer into what Schweinsteiger can contribute with there are of course several additional reasons.

First, his preferred foot is his right foot. Why is that so important, one might ask? Well, Van Gaal has expressed several times that he was looking for a right footed holding midfielder to relieve Michael Carrick. Schweinsteiger is hardly brought to the Theatre of Dreams just to step onto the big stage in moments when Carrick is injured, but Van Gaal’s motif is nonetheless reasonable. In several matches during the previous season, we saw Manchester United field a team in which seven out of ten outfield players were left footed. This in itself is quite extraordinary when we take into account that less than 20% of the world’s population is left footed. But, in addition, such a “leftward turn” also provides a system philosopher like Van Gaal a bit of a headache, since he is very concerned with specific roles and “automatisms,” and both have a lot to do with symmetry. When Van Gaal has been chasing a right footed and not a left footed number 6, it has to do with his propensity for balance and symmetry, and in this case he has estimated that he already had Daley Blind and Michael Carrick in his squad, but that the latter is aging and injury prone.

Apart from being right footed, Schweinsteiger also brings something the United team has lacked in recent years: True leaders. Perhaps they are not in need of exactly the same level of leadership that characterized Alex Ferguson’s first generation, the martial team. Just think of Peter Schmeichel, Steve Bruce, Gary Pallister, Roy Keane, Bryan Robson, Mark Hughes, and Eric Cantona being in the same team. But since the departure of players such as Keane, Rio Ferdinand, Nemanja Vidic, Patrice Evra, and Ryan Giggs, too much winning mentality responsibility has been on the shoulders of Wayne Rooney. With Schweinsteiger, Manchester United will get a player who knows how to take responsibility, someone on whom the other players can lean, and who can also make sure that Fergie Time will be re-activated as a vital component in the team’s hunt for glory.

Like Carrick, Schweinsteiger also possesses that composure, which is so crucial for midfield maestros. And these players only become maestros if they not only manage to pass safely across the field but also pass penetratingly and goal-assistingly up the field. Both Carrick and Schweini excel in this. Carrick’s importance for Van Gaal’s team in the previous season has been well documented statistically. With Schweinsteiger, Van Gaal gets a genuine replacement for Carrick, which means that last season’s loss of points during Carrick’s absence should be minimized in the coming season.

But are all Manchester United’s problems solved with the purchase of Schweinsteiger? No, that is probably stretching it a bit too far. And here are a couple of reasons why. First, Schweinsteiger lacks – like Carrick and Blind – speed, although he has often managed to hide this weakness with his foresightedness, passing skills, and composure.

The most important problem is probably Schweinsteiger’s age. Before the new season kicks off, he will have turned 31. This brings me to this article’s second concern regarding the three types of players that historically have been brought to Old Trafford.

In my previous article, I questioned Alex Ferguson’s Robin van Persie deal. It was not my intention to question if Van Persie had been a success at Old Trafford. He was. And that simply because he was the famous difference between a championship and second spot in his first season at Manchester United. But it is also a fact that he only gave Manchester United one good season – and thus two semi-bad ones.

With Schweinsteiger, we are facing a similar dilemma. Will he, like Van Persie, end up being a quick fix and give Van Gaal and Manchester United one or two good seasons? Yes, probably. But that is perhaps okay. Maybe it is a situation that United fans must get used to. That is, it’s a situation in which the manager cannot make long-term plans like Ferguson could. Even Ferguson didn’t plan for the future with Van Persie. He had a very important objective, that is, to tilt “the noisy neighbors” off the pin. He succeeded in that. But Moyes, and then Van Gaal, inherited a Van Persie whose decline began (we can see that in hindsight) with Ferguson’s retirement announcement.

Van Persie and Schweinsteiger (and Ramos) represent a type of transfer, which we for many-many years didn’t see at Old Trafford. The purchase of players aged above 27 years. But the times they are a-changing. They already began to change during the time leading up to what turned out to be Ferguson’s last season. It is a type of transfer that in reality cannot give Manchester United more than two or three good seasons.

In this transfer window, Darmian represents the second type of transfer. With his 25 years, the Italian full back is already an established player, although he of course can be further developed by Van Gaal, by his new team mates, and by the new league. He is a player that is bought with the intention of giving Manchester United five to eight good seasons. In this category, we also find players like Park and Juan Sebastian Veron.

Depay represents the third type of incoming player. He is a long-term investment like it was the case with Rooney and Luke Shaw. Here, we are talking 10-15 years of service. This is the type of player that United fans love to love. Together with the players from the academy, they are the living proofs of the club’s ongoing commitment to youth and talent development, and thus it is players like this who endow Manchester United with a tinge of eternity through continuity and the cyclic.

Many different factors play a role in determining if the three patterns described above (2-3, 5-8, 10-15) hold water in the case of individual players. It can be nationality as in David de Gea’s case, where Ferguson’s conviction regarding longevity and long-term solution in all likelihood has turned out to be an illusion. It can be ability to adapt as in the case of Veron, where Ferguson ended up selling the Argentinian earlier than planned because he never really made it at Old Trafford. In terms of durability, we also have positive outcomes where the player actually ends up surpassing the expected horizon of time. Edwin van der Sar is an example of this.

But back to Schweini. We must say the same today as we did back then in 2012, when Van Persie arrived at Old Trafford. Congratulations to Manchester United with the capture of this world-class player. May he give the club a couple of seasons at the highest level. Because it will probably not be more than that. But that is okay.

Louis van Gaal, on his appointment as manager of Manchester United, claimed that the system – that is, the formation or what he himself often refers to as “shape” – is basically unimportant. What matters, Van Gaal said, was the philosophy.

This, I would argue, is a load of rubbish – and deep down the Dutchman knows this, too. However, this does not mean that his distinction between system and philosophy is meaningless. Each of the two concepts is valuable, only they refer to two different dimensions of what we could call soccer tactics or a team’s “identity.”

On Sunday, at Anfield, the Manchester United team showed that Van Gaal’s philosophy – his much referred to “brain training” – of possession soccer, team ethos, and space exploitation/optimization had (finally) entered into a perfect symbiosis with his lately deployed 4-3-3 system. Van Gaal may still be convinced that the philosophy is the main thing and the system only secondary, but it is nevertheless symptomatic that when asked by their Dutch boss if they would like to revert to 3-5-2, Van Gaal’s players opted to stick with the 4-3-3 employed successfully (bar the Arsenal game) within recent weeks.

Some players function better in some systems, there is no getting away from that fact. It is ironic that Van Gaal initially balked at employing Manchester United’s traditional formations with wingers, the 4-3-3, 4-4-2 or 4-2-3-1 because, as he said, the team lacked world-class wingers. On Sunday at Anfield against Liverpool and the week before at Old Trafford against Tottenham, undoubtedly the team’s best performances under Van Gaal, Manchester United played 4-3-3 with Ashley Young on the left and Juan Mata on the right, the first deemed non-world class by the blunt Dutchman during preseason but slowly resurrected by the same Dutchman as a wingback, the latter initially intended to occupy the number 10 role behind Rooney and Van Persie.

Another weighty reason for Van Gaal’s reluctance to play the 4-3-3 was the same reason that made him change the successful 4-3-3 of the Dutch national team to a 3-5-2 just before the World Cup in Brazil: lack of balance. In case of the Dutch team, it was the injury to Kevin Strootman, the team’s number 6 and powerful holding midfielder, that caused Van Gaal to switch to the more prudent 3-5-2. At Old Trafford, Van Gaal didn’t see a player of Strootman’s caliber and in the first months in Manchester he talked about balance all the time, defending his decision to move Rooney into midfield even though Van Persie and Falcao were misfiring.

Now, however, it seems Van Gaal has found the balance. Michael Carrick is a less combative player than Strootman, but he has brought composure, intelligence, and urgency to United’s otherwise sideway and frigid possession play. Ander Herrera has recently shown the potential, skill, and power that everyone knew he possessed, and Marouane Fellaini has simply been a powerhouse commanding the midfield with both feet and head.

Two triangles in the United team have stood out as well-oiled engines, each with their own specific strengths. On the right, the Spanish-speaking triumvirate of Antonio Valencia at right back, Ander Herrera at right midfield, and Juan Mata at right wing brings slick movement and possession play with Valencia providing the power, width, and directness that Mata as an inside moving winger lacks. In both games, Mata was a revelation with his risk-free ball possession and intelligent movement, and of course his two goals at Anfield were the icing on the top of two brilliant performances. Herrera has learned to economize with his running and is becoming a very efficient end-to-end midfield player linking up with Mata as if they were soccer soul mates.

On the left, Daley Blind has occupied the left back position, and together with Fellaini and Young he has run havoc against the right sides of Tottenham and Liverpool. If Valencia provides speed, power, and directness, Blind is more intelligence, possession play, and composure. The muscles and presence are provided by Fellaini who starts to look more and more like a United player with the potential for cult status. If both Blind and Fellaini lack speed, Young makes up for this lack with his lightning pace. Like Mata on the right, Young prefers to cut inside, and this is why the full backs in the 4-3-3 become so important for the team’s attacking prowess. In both games, Valencia and Blind fulfilled their roles as attacking full backs brilliantly.

At this moment, the games against Tottenham and Liverpool seem to be the turning points for Van Gaal’s revolution at Old Trafford. It didn’t take three months for his philosophy to seep into the backbones of his players as he warned everybody upon his arrival in Manchester. It took seven months. This has proved to be too long for any title challenges this season – Chelsea is in all likelihood too far away in the league, and the cup defeat to Arsenal came a week before everything clicked. But it bodes well for the future.

This is not to say that everything is perfect at Old Trafford. It still remains to be seen if the team can continue collecting victories and playing dominant, vibrant soccer and thus securing the vital UEFA Champions League spot.

A few other important issues are to be dealt with. David de Gea’s contract situation is a worry for United fans, and if he is bound for Real Madrid, the club must buy a replacement ready to take over for the Spaniard without needing much time to acclimatize to the size of the club and the demands of the league.

Chris Smalling and Phil Jones may have done well against Tottenham and Liverpool, but they are still fragile as a pair. If both of them have qualities similar to Nemanja Vidic’s defensive ruthlessness (although it is still questionable if they ever reach the Serbian’s level), neither possesses Rio Ferdinand’s composure and skill. Manchester United are still in desperate need of a central defender à la Ferdinand. Mats Hummels is of course the one on everybody’s lips. It wouldn’t hurt if Raphael Varane joined him on United’s list of incoming players during the summer.

People have also talked of a new right back. While the criticism of Valencia has often been too harsh, and while Rafael might still have a future at Old Trafford (although it seems more and more unlikely), the club have been on the lookout for someone to take over from Gary Neville ever since he retired. Today, we can see that the Da Silva brothers never fulfilled the prophecy of Sir Alex Ferguson who predicted they would revolutionize the full back positions. So why not think British and try to lure Nathaniel Clyne or Seamus Coleman to Old Trafford.

Van Gaal will also be in search of a midfielder. Carrick is 33 years old and may have been a vital part of the team’s positive performances this season, but he either needs back-up or someone to replace him. Strootman’s long-term future is in doubt after two knee surgeries, but if he proves his health Van Gaal will no doubt move for him. Two other candidates are Paul Pogba and Arturo Vidal, both slightly more offensive midfielders than Strootman, but still welcome additions to a United team where Blind could still become Carrick’s long term replacement as holding midfielder.

The average age of the forward department must also be a worry for Van Gaal. If it has been age or, rather, exhaustion from the World Cup and repercussions from a serious knee injury respectively, Van Persie and Falcao have not looked like future options for Manchester United. Rooney has, together with Carrick and the outstanding De Gea, been United’s best performer this season, but at 29 he also has a time limit in terms of being a lone striker. It must be a priority for Van Gaal to bring in someone around the age of 25-27 with a proven record at the highest level (Edinson Cavani, Robert Lewandowski), or, alternatively, someone younger but with vast potential (Harry Kane, Saido Berahino, Danny Ings, Paolo Dybala, Mauro Icardi).

Finally, we should not forget Ángel Di María’s situation. If Van Gaal continues to employ a 4-3-3, Di María is born to occupy one of the wing positions, but his form has been miserable lately, and his future at Old Trafford is in doubt with rumors continuing to link him with PSG. On the one hand it would be admitting defeat by both Di María and Van Gaal if they gave up on the effort to make Di María a success at Old Trafford after just one season. On the other hand, however, it could also be a sign of Van Gaal’s ruthlessness and history of not shying away from big decisions if Di María was to leave during the summer. Leaving or not, Gareth Bale is in all likelihood a player Van Gaal and Ed Woodward will try to sign in the next transfer window. Undoubtedly, he would be a welcome addition, pure star quality and a real “Gaalactico,” but his arrival will also put a big question mark over the role of Adnan Januzaj, one of the most gifted youngsters in world soccer.

However, all this is name talk – and Van Gaal doesn’t like to talk about individual players. He is more into talking philosophy and shape, team ethos and brain training. After Anfield, we perhaps begin to realize what he has meant all the time by all his strangely fascinating (that is, David Moyes-contrasting), yet also rather vague observations, statements, and explanations about philosophy and brain. But a few additional and fresh brains are definitely needed at Old Trafford next season.

Editor’s note: Søren Frank is author of Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, which is available from all fine booksellers. 

Surely, Louis van Gaal and Alex Ferguson have many qualities in common. But their approach to soccer is also fundamentally different.

The most obvious similarity is that they are both proven winners. The Dutch began his managerial career at Ajax in Amsterdam, the country’s most prestigious and traditional club, and he continued his learning curve at FC Barcelona and FC Bayern Munich, some of Europe’s other heavyweight clubs. He won championships with all these clubs and even managed to win the Champions League with Ajax. Ferguson is primarily associated with Manchester United, a club he served for twenty-seven years as a manager, and with which he won championships galore and two Champions League titles. However, the proven winner history not only relates to these mega clubs in some of Europe’s top leagues. In many ways, what Ferguson did with Aberdeen in the 1980s before coming to Manchester can be likened to what van Gaal did with AZ Alkmaar in 2009. With Aberdeen, a small club, Ferguson broke what seemed at the time unbreakable, that is, the Celtic-Rangers monopoly on the Scottish title. Holland is comparable to Scotland in that the Dutch championship is usually won by either Ajax or PSV, but with AZ, also a small club, Van Gaal managed to disrupt what had been a continuous story with the same (or almost the same) two protagonists. What Ferguson and van Gaal did with the big clubs deserves our respect, but what proves their true winning abilities is what each of them did with these two small clubs.

Another thing shared is their willingness – perhaps even ideology – of giving youth a chance. When Ferguson won the Champions League in 1999 with his “Fledglings”, he only repeated what Van Gaal (sensationally) managed in 1995 when his young Ajax team beat mighty AC Milan in the final. In fact, it was van Gaal’s success with giving youth a chance that in 1995 convinced Ferguson to get rid of established stars such as Paul Ince, Andrei Kanchelskis, and Mark Hughes in order to pave the way for the likes of David Beckham, Paul Scholes, and Gary Neville, the backbone of the 1999 Treble-winning side.

Personality plays a hugely significant role as well, and though Ferguson and van Gaal may be very different, they both possess an almost overwhelming charisma and aura. It is difficult to say if the many titles were a consequence of their charisma, that is, if their charisma was congenital, or if their charisma is a result of their many triumphs. The truth probably lies somewhere in-between. Part of the charisma has to do with intensity, but they also share a certain choleric temperament, which some soccer players apparently need in order to thrive or to perform to the maximum of their capability.

The list of similarities could easily be continued (workaholics, attack-oriented etc.), but let us now turn our attention to the differences between Ferguson and van Gaal.

The first one (and the one from which the other differences will follow) is, I think, extremely interesting in that it concerns their basic conception of and approach to soccer. To be more specific, it has to do with their attitude toward contingency, one of the most prominent components in “the ontology of soccer.”

There is of course an element of contingency in every sport. However, the degree of contingency is higher in soccer than in, say, handball, basketball, and (American) football. The main reason for this is that you are allowed to use your hands in the latter sports, something that allows for a high degree of control over the ball, whereas in soccer you must use your feet, which are unable to seize the ball. Consequently, ball possession in soccer entails a high degree of risk. This is why the ball is more round in soccer than in basketball. And it is also why the midfield is a necessity in soccer. In handball, basketball, and football the midfield is superfluous. Possession means you are in attack. You are in defense when you don’t have possession. In soccer, there is (more or less) a continuous struggle for possession, and this (epic) struggle takes place primarily in midfield.

Unless you are some kind of suicidal, heart attack-hunting soccer manager, you will have as one of your main ambitions when preparing your team for a match to reduce the contingency factor, that is, the element of (negative) surprise. Anticipation leads to control leads to victory. However, there is quite a difference in the degree of emphasis managers put on risk management and contingency reduction.

In terms of soccer tactics, van Gaal is definitely a control freak. Alex Ferguson may be a control freak (at least in the eyes of Roy Keane), but in his case it relates more to off-field power exertions than to on-field tactics. It was symptomatic that Wayne Rooney, after Manchester United’s collapse against Leicester, used the phrase “unbelievable attention to detail” about his current manager’s methods. Van Gaal himself underlines another aspect of this mentality of anticipation and control: “The way I train and coach is in the brains and not the legs. A lot of players are playing intuitively and I want them to think and know why they do something.” The Iron Tulip’s approach is thus scientific and rational. The brains of his players are educated to think ahead. Intuition is banned because unsystematic, feelings are shut down since they entail a “being caught in the moment,” and the heartbeat is kept on a regular rhythm so that the blood doesn’t interfere with the brain’s logical thinking. Van Gaal comes close to seeing soccer as a game of chess. Nothing is left to chance.

Sometimes, van Gaal describes himself as “a risky coach.” How does that fit into his schoolmasterly propensity for “brainy” instructions meant to counter contingency? Well, it doesn’t. Make no mistake about it: When van Gaal claims to be taking a risk the choices are always made upon a backcloth of rational analysis. His much talked about substitution of Jasper Cillessen with Tim Krul during the World Cup was never a result of hic et nunc intuition but a pre-calculated move based on hardcore probability theory. And when Manchester United scored three exquisite goals, one of them pure world class, against Leicester and ultimately threw away a 3:1 lead by conceding four goals in the last twenty-eight minutes, it may lead us to believe that van Gaal is a guarantor of the re-enchantment of soccer. But he is not. If he had his way, United should simply have shut down the match by keeping possession. In other words, his players should have used their brains to counter the legs, hearts, and feelings of the Leicester players. But they couldn’t. Not because the strategy was wrong and they should have employed similar methods as Leicester, but because van Gaal hasn’t had time enough to educate his players in his “philosophy.”

In stark contrast to Rooney’s remark about van Gaal’s “unbelievable attention to detail” stands Alex Ferguson’s outbreak shortly after the final whistle of the 1999 Champions League final when United overturned Bayern Munich’s one goal-lead by scoring two goals in injury time. “Oh, I can’t believe it! I can’t believe it! Football! Bloody hell,” he almost shouted to the camera while he was smiling broadly. Now, there was a man caught up in the moment, full of feelings, who had just witnessed the contingency of soccer in all its enchanting (or, if you were a Bayern fan, devastating) power. In fact, Ferguson’s remarks following his team’s victory against Chelsea in the final nine years later also comes to mind. At that time he labeled John Terry’s famous slip “destiny.” Not exactly a word associated with rationality, probability theory, and brain, but, arguably, more with superstition, heart, and romanticism. Or if it had anything to do with rationalization, it was a post facto. It was, in fact, Ferguson’s attempt to connect the death of eight grail-hunting Busby Babes in 1958 with the club’s European triumph in 2008, forty years after the Munich Air Disaster; that is, it was his merely human effort to fit two disparate events into a (metaphysical) pattern and thus create meaning in a godless world.

“Fergie time” was a symptom of Alex Ferguson’s approach to soccer and its high degree of contingency. Instead of trying to conquer and beat contingency, instead of trying to control it with his brain and rationality, Ferguson accepted it as part and parcel of soccer and eventually got the upper hand over it by playing with it, by entering the zone of contingency on its own premises. It would be a big mistake to underestimate the hard work and meticulous preparations carried out by Alex Ferguson, René Meulensteen, Carlos Queiroz, and Mike Phelan at Carrington. They used scripts, studied video material, knew all the physical performance levels of each player, and their dietary details as well, and they practiced 4-2-3-1, 4-4-2, and 4-4-1-1. In short, they devoted a lot of time and energy on “automatisms” and “systems.” But when these automatisms didn’t work, when the patterns and designs were malfunctioning or without effect, during matches, Ferguson’s teams could always switch into another dimension, the dimension of beastly instinct, intuition, and risky adventure. Turn off your brains and go full throttle forward was his mantra. Was it the result of pre-calculated moves when Teddy Sheringham and Ole Gunnar Solskjær scored against Bayern Munich in injury time? No, not at all. It was the consequence of Ferguson’s successful “play” with contingency – successful because of Peter Schmeichel causing panic in Bayern’s defense, successful because of a predatory character instilled into the team by their docker manager, and successful because of the spatial intuition of Solskjær. And perhaps also, back then in 1999, successful because of “destiny”. After all, the final was played on what would have been Sir Matt Busby’s ninetieth birthday.

The differences between van Gaal and Ferguson may have been exaggerated a little in the above. van Gaal take risks and lets his feelings be known. Ferguson conceived tactical master plans and used his brain in moments of chaos. Nevertheless, their basic conception of soccer and their attitude toward its contingent nature seems to be very different. If the one puts emphasis on the brain and rationality, the other encouraged the use of intuition and considered feelings to be fuel. If one wants to control contingency, the other wanted to play with it. If one likes to anticipate, the other wanted to seize the moment. If one rarely gets off his seat during matches, the other often stood by the touchline either instructing, encouraging, or “hairdrying” his players, or giving the referee a dressing, or manipulating the fourth official into adding an extra minute or two of injury time. If the one has a background as a schoolteacher, the other has a background in the shipyards and factories of Glasgow.

Their differences and their different approaches to soccer combined with their common history of winning titles show us that there are many ways to win. The fascinating thing is just that: We are drawn to the winners, and we are intrigued by their different “philosophies.”

To Manchester United’s many fans, it must have been a long-awaited pleasure to watch their team with its many recently imported “Gaalacticos” demolish Queens Park Rangers at Old Trafford after a poor start to the season and after a truly miserable last season. The signs were there in their 4:0 win, the signs of future success and restored pride.

However, as their Dutch manager Louis van Gaal pointed out after the game against QPR, his new team can, will, and need to play much better. Even man-of-the-match, the Argentine wizard Ángel Di María, who so far has been worth every penny of his record breaking transfer fee as he seems to have naturally and effortlessly assumed the role of talisman, received a few words of critique from the demanding Iron Tulip who thought Di María had been sloppy in possession on a few occasions. The victory against QPR was important, and the manner in which it was secured brought back the memories of Alex Ferguson’s flamboyant and relentlessly attacking Manchester United teams. But only time will tell if the QPR match was the one in which the team began its journey back to where the club sees itself, that is, at the summit of English and European soccer.

To me, we still need to see four things.

1. We need to see consistency. One match alone doesn’t do the trick. Van Gaal must put together a string of victories, not only to prove that the QPR match was not a mere coincidence (as many victories proved to be under David Moyes), but also in order to catch up with José Mourinho’s pacesetters from Chelsea.

2. Consistency in terms of collecting victories should be coupled with a continuously progressive evolution of Van Gaal’s attacking style of soccer. One thing is to play well and play beautiful soccer against QPR at Old Trafford, another thing is to keep doing it home and away and thus be true to Manchester United’s traditions of balancing competitiveness and trophies with beauty, excellence, and entertainment.

3. We need to see is Manchester United being able to compete against Chelsea, Manchester City, Liverpool, and Arsenal, the four most obvious teams vying for the Champions League spots. Last season was a disaster against these rivals since Moyes only collected five out a possible twenty-four points. The real tests come when Manchester United step out at Old Trafford on 26 October to face Chelsea and a week later when they will travel across town to meet Manchester City at the Etihad Stadium.

4. Finally, in order for Manchester United to be really back on track and converging with their true identity again we need to see the team score decisive goals in “Fergie time”. This predatory ability was a vital component of the team’s fear factor during Alex Ferguson’s reign, an ability that only seemed to be self-reinforcing as the opponent teams often looked as if they almost expected Manchester United to score a late winner. David Moyes never succeeded in sustaining this tradition of beastly instinct in injury time, but if Van Gaal makes his Gaalacticos gel he will have every opportunity to restore this Manchester United talent.

After eight-and-a-half injury-plagued, yet successful years at Anfield, Liverpool’s Danish vice captain Daniel Agger was allowed to leave this summer after finding himself dropping further down the pecking order. However, Agger was not only allowed to leave, he was allowed to leave for practically nothing. The main reason for this was that it was his boyhood club Brøndby that came knocking on the door – and perhaps Agger’s allegedly tearful “please allow me to leave” plead to Brendan Rogers, Liverpool’s manager, also played its part. Brøndby bought Agger back for three million pounds, perhaps a big sum for a Danish club but nevertheless very cheap compared to what Liverpool might have gotten for Agger if they had sold him to Napoli or FC Barcelona. After all, we are talking about a player that was wanted last year by Barcelona who supposedly offered close to 15 million pounds only twelve months ago.

This summer, Agger could also have gone to almost every decent club in the top four leagues of Europe – Napoli, Arsenal, and Barcelona was mentioned among others. And if he had, he would definitely have had an instant impact. But he chose to return to his boyhood club, and he did so out of what I wouldn’t hesitate to call “existential necessity”. For Agger, there are only two clubs in this world, Liverpool FC and Brøndby IF. Both of them are literally inscribed onto his body. Again, Agger could have gone to Napoli this year or Barcelona last year, but he chose – quite sensationally – Brøndby in Denmark. Why? Because money didn’t matter to Agger. But feelings did. And they are the kind of feelings we don’t see anymore in the world of professional soccer. Feelings of loyalty and belonging, but also of pride and happiness – or, in Agger’s case at Anfield, hurt pride and unhappiness.

After all, we are talking about a player who, apart from turning his back on several possibilities in the best leagues in Europe, is only 29 years old, that is, in his prime, and still captain of the Danish national team. To many, it was inexplicable why Agger wasn’t good enough for Liverpool’s starting XI. He was rated among the best playing and ball-passing centre-halfs in the Premier League, a player with incredible composure, vision, and presence.

There runs a constant undercurrent beneath all this, though. Agger’s health. His body is quite simply more fragile than others. Apparently, he himself became increasingly aware that life in the Premier League was too hard for his injury-prone body.

When returning to the Danish Superliga, Agger will definitely be in a class of his own, a level or even two levels above the rest. And due to him being an intelligent and game-reading central defender, and because Brøndby’s coaching staff will undoubtedly create a training program individually fine-tuned to Agger, he will be able to play for several years in the Superliga, and he will probably remain its absolute star for just as long.

At Brøndby IF, he is welcomed back as a saint, and his homecoming has already meant a sold-out Brøndby Stadion. His transfer is by far the most sensational in the history of Danish soccer. And it could only happen because feelings of loyalty, belonging, (hurt) pride, and (un)happiness means more to Agger than money.

In that respect Agger is a dying breed in modern day soccer. Perhaps the very last of a dying breed.

The evolution of soccer is not linear. Residues from the past sometimes rise again despite being deemed outmoded and elements never to be thought of as vanishing suddenly begin to fade. The evolution of soccer happens in waves.

During the last two decades – in some countries even longer – the center of creativity on a soccer pitch was actually not to be found in the center but on the margins. This era saw the widespread use of the 4-4-2, 4-3-3, and 4-2-3-1 formations which all used two or three central midfielders concentrating on keeping the team’s balance between defense and attack intact. In addition to the central midfielders, two full backs provided defensive reassurance out wide. The central midfielders and the full backs meant a relatively free attacking role for the two wingers. The central midfielders even made it possible for the team to attack with one full back at the time (or, for some teams, even with both full backs simultaneously) provided that his defensive duties were respected. Both these facts – free wingers and attacking full backs – emphasize that the team’s attacking threat and center of creativity were to be found out wide.

Some of the most prominent examples of this trend were:

• FC Barcelona’s Lionel Messi a few years back when he had his base out right and with Dani Alves providing both defensive coverage for and attacking threat together with Messi,

• Manchester United’s Ryan Giggs who ran up and down the left side for the most part of his career with Denis Irwin or Phil Neville occupying the left back position behind him,

• Cristiano Ronaldo in both Manchester United and Real Madrid who teamed up with Patrice Evra and Fabio Coentrao from his position on the left wing, and, finally,

• Neymar in today’s Barcelona team who has Jordi Alba as support.

However, certain coaches and teams choosing to recycle the 3-5-2, 5-3-2, and the 3-4-3 formations that were the preferred formations of the 1970s and 1980s are now challenging this trend. Antonio Conte has been doing it with his Juventus team for a few years. Brendan Rogers at Liverpool has experimented with three defenders. And during the recently held World Cup in Brazil, several teams used 5-3-2, among them Mexico and Holland. Holland’s coach Louis van Gaal, who has just taken over the hot seat at Manchester United, is set to continue with the formation at Old Trafford.

We often hear coaches say that the formation is not that important, that it is just numbers. Van Gaal himself has said that what matters most is his philosophy – a philosophy associated with “Total Football” demanding multifunctional players and emphasizing speed, technical skills, and tactical intelligence. The formation matters less to Van Gaal who has employed 4-3-3 at Ajax, 2-3-2-3 at Barcelona, and 4-4-2 at AZ Alkmaar. Van Gaal’s formational flexibility stems from his desire to adapt to the players at his disposal. It may be true that for Van Gaal philosophy matters most and formation less, but it is not true – neither for Van Gaal nor for any other coach – that the formation is not important and that it is just a numbers game.

The attacking threat and the creative epicenter of the 4-4-2 and the 4-2-3-1 are often associated with the wingers’ license to dribble and challenge their opponents one-on-one. The creativity of the 5-3-2, on the other hand, is necessarily moved to the center of the pitch since the formation only has one wide player on each side whose main obligation is defensive (since no full back provides back-up). If number 7 and number 11, the traditional numbers for the two wingers, were key men in the 4-4-2, number 10 is the main man in the 3-5-2 and 5-3-2. The 1970s, 1980s and part of the 1990s were also the heyday of the great number 10s in soccer. This was the decades during which players such as Mario Kempes, Diego Maradona, Zico, Michel Platini, Michael Laudrup, Roberto Baggio, and Gheorghe Hagi dominated the world scene.

If the 3-5-2 formation makes the rebirth of the traditional playmaker possible, it also makes it possible to play with two real attackers, something which fewer and fewer teams have been doing during the last ten years (the 4-4-2 often means 4-4-1-1 or 4-2-3-1). If freedom existed – freedom to roam, freedom from defensive obligations, and freedom to dribble – in the 4-2-3-1 formation, this freedom is transferred onto the number 10 and partly also to the two attackers in the 3-5-2.

Louis Van Gaal’s decision to use the 5-3-2 formation with Holland during the World Cup was mainly because of his desire to give as much freedom as possible to Wesley Sneijder, Robin van Persie, and, not least, Arjen Robben. At Manchester United, he has inherited what he calls an “unbalanced squad” with too many strikers and too many number 10s. If he plays Van Persie as a lone striker and uses Wayne Rooney in the hole behind him, Juan Mata and Shinji Kagawa cannot be used in their favorite role just as Danny Welbeck and Javier Hernandez will be pushed onto the bench. If he employes the 3-5-2, however, he will be able to accommodate both Rooney and Van Persie as strikers as well as Mata as number 10. In many ways this makes sense if one thinks about David Moyes’s problems last year with fitting in Mata and Kagawa.

But it will also mean troubles ahead for some of Manchester United’s many wingers. The Red Devils has been, historically speaking, a club associated with a swashbuckling style of soccer with flamboyant wingers often being the stars of the team. Billy Meredith was the first in a long line of dribbling wide players at Old Trafford including George Best, Willie Morgan, Ryan Giggs, and Cristiano Ronaldo. Today, the club boasts of wide players such as Ashley Young, Nani, Wilfried Zaha, Antonio Valencia, and Adnan Januzaj who were either bought or used as traditional wingers. Some of them will be able to adapt to the role of wingback, some will not. Those who will be able to adapt will face competition for the wingback positions from the club’s fullbacks such as Luke Shaw and Rafael. Those who will not be able to adapt will either have to leave the club or compete with Rooney, Van Persie, Welbeck, Hernandez, Mata, and Kagawa for the three central attacking positions.

Only time will tell who has the tactical intelligence and technical skill to take on board Van Gaal’s philosophy and adapt to his formation. It may be that Zaha is able to convince the Dutch tactician of his attacking talent; Young seems to be vying for a wingback position; Valencia has often been used; Januzaj is simply too good to be sidetracked by formational subtleties (besides, United’s former assistant manager René Meulensteen already said a year ago that Januzaj’s best position was probably number 10); but Van Gaal’s 3-5-2 does seem to be bad news for Nani.

Editor’s note: Søren Frank is author of Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, which is available from all fine booksellers.

What do Billy Meredith, Stanley Matthews, Raymond Kopa, Manolo Garrincha, George Best, Allan Simonsen, Bryan Robson, Eric Cantona, Luis Figo, Raúl González, Andrei Shevchenko, David Villa and Cristiano Ronaldo have in common? Besides all of them being legends of soccer, they have all played a crucial role in making number 7 a mythological shirt number in the history of soccer.

Outside the world of soccer, the number 7 also has a long and glorious history with many meanings that contribute to making the number loaded with references and connotations on the soccer pitch. There are the Seven Hills of Rome and Rome’s seven emperors, and preceding the Roman heyday there was, in Greek mythology, Seven against Thebes, adapted and immortalized in dramatic form by both Aischylos and Euripides. There was also the Seven Wonders of the World. In addition, we refer to the Seven Seas, and with the naked eye humans are capable of seeing seven planets. As some will know, water’s pH value is 7. Seven is supposedly also the amount of hours that humans need for their optimal sleep.

However, it is in the religious sphere that the number 7 draws the majority of its symbolic potential. In Judaism, the number is associated with the spirituality and divinity that was blown into Creation. The seventh day is Sabbath and day of rest and repose in Judaism and Christianity respectively, and in the latter religion the very act of creation – Genesis – lasted seven days. We also speak of the seven good and the seven bad years. There are even seven cardinal virtues and seven cardinal sins. Apart from that, the number 7 generally refers to perfection within the Christian faith. In Islam, there are seven doors to the seven earths and seven heavens, and in Buddhism Buddha walked seven steps when he was born. The superstitious believe that a broken mirror is followed by seven years with bad luck.

In popular culture, most people know the agent “double o seven,” agent 007, alias James Bond, and many remember the iconic image of Marilyn Monroe’s dress in the movie The Seven Year Itch. There is also Akira Kurosawa’s The Seven Samurais and John Sturges’s American version of Kurosawa’s Japanese movie, The Magnificent Seven. Or Ingmar Bergman’s The Seventh Seal. In 1849, the English intellectual John Ruskin published The Seven Lamps of Architecture and two years later came Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables.

Incidentally, it is a fact that most people choose the number 7 if they are asked to think of a number between 1 and 10.

Right after number 10, the number 7 is undoubtedly the most myth-ridden number in the history of soccer. It might even be the most mythic number since a certain degree of indeterminacy is attached to number 7, which is not in the same way bestowed upon number 10. Number 10 is traditionally (and I deliberately write “traditionally” because in recent years we have witnessed an uprooting in what used to be rather rigid relations between shirt number and position on the pitch) the creative fulcrum whose base is the center of the pitch occupying a free role in front of one or more defense-oriented dustmen and behind one or two attackers. In contrast, number 7 is harder to define and his position more difficult to pinpoint. If number 7 shares the attack-oriented tint with number 10, he can, in turn, be found both out wide and centrally.

Originally, number 7 was right wing in the 2-3-5 and W-M formations while number 10 was inside left forward. Everybody agreed on that. In England, two of the most famous number 7 from the classical wing era are Billy Meredith (Manchester City and Manchester United, 1894-1924) and Stanley Matthews (Stoke and Blackpool, 1932-65), while Raymond Kopa from France (Stade de Reims and Real Madrid, 1949-67) and Mané Garrincha from Brazil (Botafogo, 1953-72) are two others. Among the most famous number 10s from the epoch of 2-3-5 and W-M we can mention Ferenc Puskás (Honvéd Budapest and Real Madrid, 1943-66), Dennis Viollet (Manchester United and Stoke, 1950-67), and Eusébio (Benfica, 1957-78). However, in the 1950s the first transformation took place courtesy of Gusztáv Sebes’s Hungarian national team that played a sort of 4-2-4. Sebes pulled number 9 back to a deeper-lying and free forward position behind number 8 and number 10 who now represented the two central attackers. This paved the way for the classical number 10 who in Sebes’s team was played by Nandor Hidegkuti with number 9 on his back, though.

Where number 10 in the 2-3-5 and W-M formations had the same role as number 8, it now differentiates itself and becomes a unique number attached to a unique position on the pitch. This is the time when a player like Pelé starts to define number 10 as the creative fulcrum who also scores a lot of goals. The classical number 10 period comes later, though, and is associated with players like Michel Platini, Diego Maradona, Enzo Francescoli, Michael Laudrup, Carlos Valderrama, Gheorghe Hagi, Roberto Baggio and Zico in the 1980s and 1990s. With players such as Rivaldo and Ronaldinho, the classical number 10 role is already under transformation since both these players, when playing for their club teams, often had their base on the left. A player like Francesco Totti is also at first glance a typical number 10, but at AS Roma under Spaletti he often operated as sole attacker in the Italian’s hyperflexible 4-5-1/4-6-0 (although he was an atypical sole attacker since he often dropped deep and participated a lot in the build-up – his role was thus a typical number 9, but he behaved more like a number 10). Zinedine Zidane is perhaps the last classical number 10, but even he was often used on the left in Real Madrid. Lionel Messi and Neymar are the latest additions to this long history of number 10s in soccer. The former’s favorite position seems to be a mix of and an oscillation between right and central attacker (a “false 9”), while the latter is mostly based on the left.

Number 10 is thus historically speaking a role undergoing change: from inside left forward to the centrally based creative fulcrum to the current more indeterminate role as attacking talisman, but it is beyond doubt that the heyday of the classical number 10 as we understand it today was in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

Number 7 can also be said to be associated with a role that changes historically, but at the same time this is a change that results in far greater indeterminacy. Originally, number 7 was always right wing, but in the 1970s the softening and transformation of the old 2-3-5 and 3-2-2-3 truly begin and the player wearing the number 7 jersey can now be central midfielder, winger or center forward. As we will see shortly, there are great number 7’s in all three categories.

It is also interesting that the number is associated with much prestige in certain clubs and on certain national teams. In my own country, number 7 has been an important component in central midfield on the Danish national team in modern times. In the 1980s, Jens Jørn Bertelsen wore the jersey with the magical number. However, there was nothing magical about the diminutive, yet “great” Bertelsen. He was quite simply the team’s point of balance, the team’s invisible laborer, without which players such as Preben Elkjær, Michael Laudrup, Allan Simonsen, and Frank Arnesen would never have been able to express themselves creatively. Bertelsen was perhaps the closest Denmark ever has been to a Claude Makelele. This tradition was renewed by John “Faxe” Jensen (who played for Brøndby and Arsenal) who like Bertelsen was a sort of garbage man in midfield, although he was more visible and aggressive than Bertelsen ever was. Allan Nielsen (who played for Brøndby and Tottenham), also a central midfielder, represented a short intermezzo before Thomas Gravesen (Everton, Real Madrid, Celtic) conferred the number 7 a new dimension on the Danish national team. Still centrally positioned in midfield, Gravesen added to the number attacking gloss with his visionary passes and dangerous long range shots. However, in Gravesen’s style there were still elements of garbage man and snappy watch dog.

A totally different tradition exists on the Brazilian national team where Bebéto in modern time made number 7 synonymous with the intelligent second striker, either besides Romarío or Ronaldo. After Bebéto, players such as Ronaldinho and Robinho have worn number 7, and in that sense one can say that the shirt often indicates who will be Seleção’s next number 10.

In several of the world’s leading clubs, the number 7 is a shirt number with a great tradition. But there are also examples of clubs where the number 7 is associated with something ominous. In Chelsea, Brian Laudrup initiated an unlucky trend when he was given the number 7 jersey after Gustavo Poyet. Laudrup, a typical second striker who thrived in free roles with a license to roam around in the margins, simply did not fit into Chelsea’s system, and his stay on Stamford Bridge was short and without success. After Laudrup arrived, the Romanian Adrian Mutu, a typical number 10 full and of self-confidence, but the latter was quickly taken out of him by Claudio Ranieri and José Mourinho. After having proven his worth in the Italian Serie A, Mutu became yet another victim of the system, and his difficulties of adapting to the English culture resulted in drug abuse. After the Chelsea failure, Mutu returned to Italy where he helped Fiorentina put pressure on the four big clubs. Following the departure of Mutu, Chelsea imported another “Italian,” AC Milan’s Andrei Shevchenko, who in several seasons had been Milan’s attacking star and top scorer. In addition, the Ukranian had even been elected the best soccer player in Europe before his arrival in London, but like his predecessors he never was comfortable with Chelsea’s number 7 on his back, a number that he had otherwise made legendary in Milan. Yet again the system was part of the problem because Shevchenko had been bought as a striker, but in Mourinho’s system there was only room for one of those, and his choice fell upon Didier Drogba.

It is a completely different story if we look toward Madrid and the city’s royal club. In modern times, the number 7 has become synonymous with goals, loyalty, and attacking intelligence, first incarnated with Emilio Butragueño, then with Raúl González. Both these players are examples of second strikers who besides being prolific goalscorers specialize in connecting midfield and attack and in finding the “Duty Free” zones between these chains in the opponent team. Butragueño made up one of the most dangerous attacks ever with Hugo Sanchez, Real Madrid’s number 9 from Mexico (and behind them Michael Laudrup excelled as a number 10 in two seasons after his controversial transfer from FC Barcelona, and behind Laudrup, in Valdano’s preferred midfield diamond formation, the defensive anchor was the Argentinian Fernando Redondo). Raúl has had changing partners in his long career, amongst them was Davor Suker and Ruud van Nistelrooy, both typical number 9’s and worthy heirs to Sanchez.

There was a Danish player who played in the same position as Butragueño and Raúl but who made the number famous before they did. In the national team he played with number 9, but at Borussia Mönchengladbach he wore the number 7 jersey. The player was Allan Simonsen, the only Dane ever to win the Ballon d’Or. He did so in 1977 when he was a striker on Gladbach’s skyrocketing team. Later, Simonsen was sold to Barcelona where he made up a very dangerous attacking duo with the Austrian Hans Krankl.

Liverpool FC is another club where number 7 has mythical status, but within recent years there has been a certain amount of players not able to carry on the legacy after Ian Callaghan, Kevin Keegan, Kenny Dalglish, and Peter Beardsley. Both Keegan, Dalglish, and Beardsley were players moulded in the same soil as Simonsen: small, elegant, prolific, and creative., Harry Kewell, the Australian, had his Anfield career ruined by injuries, but injuries or not, Kewell perhaps never had the potential to wear the jersey. Robbie Keane was bought from Tottenham for £20million and sold again six months later for £15million to the same club. Indeed a bizarre story since Keane had proven for years that he was a consistent goal scorer in the Premier League, but Rafa Benitez’s patience with the Irish striker nevertheless only lasted half a year. The latest to wear the famous jersey was Luis Suárez, bought in Ajax for £20 million and just sold to Barcelona for more than £70 million. Suárez’s Liverpool history may have been blighted by bans but his goals and overall importance for the team cannot be underestimated. He was the main reason for Brendan Rodgers’s successful Liverpool re-awakening in 2013/14. With Suárez, Liverpool can add another name after the legends Keegan, Dalglish, and Beardsley.

Manchester United is arguably the club where number 7 is most mythical. The English club has had no less than six club legends wearing number 7: Billy Meredith, George Best, Bryan Robson, Eric Cantona, David Beckham, and, Cristiano Ronaldo. This list bears witness of number 7’s indeterminacy and manifold qualitative potentials since the list comprises flamboyant art of dribbling out wide, magical forward play, and a martial midfield dynamo. When Alex Ferguson controversially sold Beckham to Real Madrid in 2003 and bought what was then an unknown Cristiano Ronaldo, it was an unequivocal sign of the manager’s trust and a clear signal of future greatness when Ronaldo was handed number 7 after Beckham (who had inherited it after Cantona, who had inherited it after Robson).

Today, Ronaldo plays for Real Madrid where he took over number 7 from Raúl. In Bayern Munich, most often from a position out left, Franck Ribéry haunts the defense of opposing teams with number 7 on his back. Alexis Sanchez has recently done the same for Chile at Brazil 2014, although from the opposite side of the pitch. At Anfield and at Old Trafford, the fans are eager to see if this summer’s transfer window will bring in new potential legends wearing their club’s most mythical jersey.

As a Manchester United fan, I would like to see number 7 on the back of Adnan Januzaj, that’s for sure.

Editor’s note: Søren Frank is author of Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, which is available from all fine booksellers.

Ten years. That’s how long the German team, their head coach, and the entire backroom staff have worked – worked hard and determined, that is – to reach the ultimate goal: World Champions.

We have seen it before. In the late 1990s France began to dominate the European and World scenes. Then Spain took over. Now the cycle has got Germany’s name on it. As with France and Spain, so in Germany: It all began with small revolutions within the youth development systems. If Brazil 2002 and Italy 2006 were “coincidences” (but still beautiful events, of course), France 1998, Spain 2010, and Germany 2014 were the results of organic developments that culminated in the World Cup finals. It may be that Germany will be dominating the scene in two year’s time, maybe even in four year’s time. But then evolution will probably see another country come to the fore. Teams always have their own cycle, as Sir Alex Ferguson once remarked – rise and fall are inevitably linked.

Joachim Löw must be given a lot of credit for Germany’s triumph. I was disappointed with the tactical finesse of Luiz Felipe Scolari (too naïve) and Alejandro Sabella (too dependent on Messi), whereas I was impressed – hugely impressed – by Löw and Louis van Gaal. Those two managers were among the main reasons why Europe eventually triumphed over South America, in South America, since they always had a tactical masterplan. Löw showed adaptability during Germany’s campaign, for example when replacing Mario Götze (as a “false” number 9) with Miroslav Klose (a traditional number 9), which also meant a slight change in tactics, and when moving Philipp Lahm from midfield to his old position as right back. Adaptability was not Löw’s only strength, though. If he showed flexibility, he did indeed also stand by his basic philosophy, a philosophy that has characterized the German team in recent years. Inspired by Spain and executed by the “new generation” of German soccer players, Löw (and Jürgen Klinsmann) has prioritized ball possession, flair, and fluidity (but in contrast to Spain, the German team has been more physical and direct in their approach). In short, we have seen a red thread in Germany’s World Cup campaign, a soccer identity. This identity can be traced back to the World Cup in Germany in 2006, and it is a proof of how successful the Germans have been in their “re-branding” that the German team has become the favorite team of many non-Germans.

The German victory was a result of team effort and a collective approach. In a way, no German player is a star. In another way, they are all stars. Eleven (Germans) showed that they were more than Messi plus ten (Argentinians). I have written about this difference in style and approach before, but let me repeat it: Germany and the Netherlands are teams without a Messi or Neymar, and in a way this sets them free tactically – or, in another way, it obligates their manager to actually work hard with team tactics in order to get the best out of every player. Messi and Neymar can be sedatives for a manager. The German team has been set up by Löw to function as a team, to work like a team, to defend like a team, and to attack like a team. We see it, sometimes, when the “automatisms” suddenly work and the epiphanies of form materialize. All the players are in it together. Of course some players incarnate this quality more than others. Thomas Müller may be the epitome of German collectivism, but even Mesut Özil is part of it.

Some players stand out, it cannot be denied. Manuel Neuer is surely one of them. Whether he is the best ever goalkeeper, as Franz Beckenbauer said on the evening of the German triumph, or not, he is definitely the best goalkeeper in the world at this moment. With his stature he reminds me of a compatriot of mine, the great Peter Schmeichel who was twice elected the best keeper in the world. Neuer also has an ability to almost frighten his opponents by way of his sheer size. Like Schmeichel, he also seems to be in possession of a larger than normal portion of self-confidence bordering on arrogance. His shotstopping skills are second to none, and he dominates the penalty area. Compared to Schmeichel, he is a more modern goalkeeper, though, since his technique and passing skills are better. He even takes on the role as sweeper quite often, a role required of him as a result of the German team’s attack-oriented and risky approach.

It used to be said that you needed a good goalkeeper and a good goalscorer to win tournaments. Nowadays it has become increasingly evident that you also need a good bench. Several games during the World Cup in Brazil were decided by players coming off the bench, and Germany’s bench was definitely among the most decisive benches. Schürrle had earlier done what Götze did in the final, come off the bench to score. A good bench is both a question of squad quality and depth and a question of managerial cleverness. As to the latter, just think of Van Gaal’s substitution of Jasper Cillesen with Tim Krul just before the penalty shootout between Costa Rica and Holland. Löw’s decision to play Klose from the beginning against Argentina was perhaps what allowed Götze to become the match winner for the Germans since he benefitted from Klose’s tireless work upon the Argentinian defense. Germany won the World Cup partly because they had the best bench and a manager who knew how to use that bench.

To me, another player also stood out. Toni Kroos was the best player of the tournament. He dictated the rhythm and pace of Germany’s matches like Andrea Pirlo does it for Italy and Paul Scholes used to do it for Manchester United. FIFA’s decision to name Lionel Messi the best player of the tournament was disappointing in several ways. Messi did have his moments of magic, but in general – and in comparison with his own previous standards – he had a substandard tournament. The most disappointing thing to me about FIFA’s decision, however, was that they made the easy choice. They elected an individualist. But it was not the individualist and his team of ten servants who won the World Cup, it was a team player together with his ten teammates (and his coach and backroom staff). A German team without a Messi and without a Neymar (who can decide matches in splitseconds through individual actions of genius) is dependent on someone who can control the rhythm and pace of their collective game. Kroos did that (although he had a substandard final), and without him Germany would not have been so convincing and appealing to watch. Kroos, in that sense, is the epitome of Germany, the World Champions, and instead of the automatic choice of Messi, the genius number 10 who had a substandard tournament and no gold winner’s medal, FIFA should have honored the World Champions and their different approach with the election of Kroos, the rhythm-dictating number 18 who has a brilliant tournament and a gold medal, as the best player of the tournament.

If Germany won because of the culmination of an organic development, a tactical masterplan, team effort, the world’s best goalkeeper, their bench, and the best conductor, they may be short of two things in order to be the perfect team. I mentioned before that it used to be said that in order to win tournaments a team must have a good goalkeeper and a good goalscorer. Germany got away with not really having a “true” number 9. Klose is a goalgetter but past his best (and he was, in my opinion, never among the best in the world). Müller managed to score five goals, but he is more like an extremely efficient utility man than a real goalscorer. The Germans did score goals, though, and perhaps their fluid style is a reminder that the typical number 9 is dispensable, if you have the best goalkeeper, the best conductor, and the best bench.

The second weakness of the German team was their left back, or, rather, the fact that he was right footed. Benedikt Höwedes is a really good player, but he is not really a left back, instead his favorite (and normal) position is central defense. Höwedes did his job in defense, but when Germany attacked they would have been better off with a left footed left back. It would have given them more penetration and better crosses. But again, no team is perfect, and because of Löw’s tactical cleverness and his team’s collective profile, Germany could get away with a couple of small “compromises”.

Editor’s note: Søren Frank is author of Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, which is available from all fine booksellers.

During the World Cup 2014 at Brazil, it has become more evident that Germany’s new maestro is Toni Kroos. Bastian Schweinsteiger is still a vital component in the team’s offensive configurations. Sami Khedira has proven that he is still Germany’s best defensive anchor in midfield, while Mesut Özil – despite a disappointing World Cup campaign – still has Joachim Löw’s confidence. But if Özil used to be the heartbeat, the very center of pulsation, of Germany’s attacking patterns, this role has now been taken by Toni Kroos who occupies a role in front of Khedira and behind Germany’s three front men – a typical number 8 able to both defend and (even more so) attack.

And yes, there are many things typical about Kroos. Historically, German soccer players have never been afraid of shooting from long range, and this is also the case with Kroos. His technique, power, and balance endow him with a very powerful, “pure”, and elegant long shot. The same can be said of his winning mentality: it is steeped in a German tradition of never giving up. As is the case with his own generation of “new” German soccer players (Özil, Götze, Reus, Schürrle, all trained within the German academy system that was reformed in the beginning of this century), Kroos is also technically gifted, and his passing ability is on the highest level of precision.

However, there are also things unusual about Kroos. With his recent performances for Germany and Bayern Munich, Kroos is about to earn himself a place in the same very exclusive category to which players like Andrea Pirlo, Xavi, Luka Modric, and Paul Scholes also belong. That is, the category of the great maestros of soccer. Like a conductor in front of an orchestra, the soccer maestro must be a master of his craft. He must possess an exemplary level of passing accuracy, technical ability, and tactical awareness. But the skill that more than anything else sets the maestro apart from his teammates is his ability to dictate the rhythm of a game.

We can (inspired by the French linguist Émile Benvéniste) define rhythm as a changing structure that realizes itself in time. That is, rhythm is a temporalized becoming-form. Rhythms thus constitute a certain inertia against formlessness and pure fluidity, mainly because of their dependency of repetitions. However, within this structure of repetition, and in order to prevent deadly monotony, rhythms are also dependent on movements and differences. In other words, rhythms are a finely tuned balance between continuity, identity, and repetition (in order for there to be form), on the one hand, and contrast, difference, and change (in order to avoid monotony) on the other.

In a soccer game, rhythm is dependent on several dimensions. Kroos, I would argue, is a champion of all these dimensions. The two most significant dimensions are time and space and within both of these we find different sub-dimensions, some of which are interconnected. In the spatial dimension there is a difference in rhythm between lateral and vertical passes. The vertical passes lead to a more direct form of soccer, and their ambition is often to be decisive and goal-seeking. Here we already see why the space and time dimensions and their different sub-dimensions are interconnected. Directness and decisiveness in the spatial dimension entail higher tempo and, potentially, a more punctual timeline respectively in the temporal dimension. In contrast, lateral passing entails a more indirect, some would say laborious, form of soccer, and the main objectives behind lateral passes are continuous (as opposed to punctual) ball possession and gradual exhaustion of the opponent team – and, eventually, bigger (that is, less risky in relation to continuous ball possession) opportunities for more decisive passes.

While almost every team employs both variants, some teams are defined by one of those variants. Pep Guardiola’s FC Barcelona and FC Bayern Munich are teams practicing a lateral form of soccer (although Lionel Messi, in Guardiola’s Barcelona side, often provided a more direct and vertical dimension through his dribbling and raids). In contrast, Jupp Heynckes’s FC Bayern Munich practiced a more direct form of soccer (the most blatant example of direct soccer was probably Egil “Drillo” Olsen’s Norway team in the 1990s in which lateral passing was regarded more or less as a crime, although it should be kept in mind that Drillo’s verticality – due to aspirations of absolute risk minimization – was mostly airborne). Kroos played for both Heynckes and Guardiola and has been able to adapt to both philosophies. Löw’s Germany, I would argue, comes closer to Heynckes’s style, and Kroos has thus been allowed to play the ball a bit more forward than he is used to from the current Bayern Munich side.

Within the spatial dimension we also come upon the difference between long and short passes. Now, if the basic objective of both is to find and exploit free space, the first (whether a vertical Pirlo pass to Mario Balotelli into the space behind the opponent team’s defensive line or a lateral Scholes pass from one side of the field to Antonio Valencia on the opposite side) is often employed by the great maestros to destabilize the entire defensive organization of the opponent team whereas the latter’s effect (whether a lateral Xavi pass to Alexis Sanchez or a vertical Modric pass to Ronaldo) is more local, although not necessarily less effective in terms of destabilization.

Whether we speak of long, short, lateral or vertical passes (and combinations of them), the rhythm of the game is dependent on the precision of those passes. As the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre remarked in relation to his own “rhythmanalysis”, we often don’t notice the fundamental rhythmic character of life until the basic rhythms are disturbed or break down (as when our heart starts to beat irregularly or, more fatal, stops to beat). The same is true with soccer. We only become aware of the rhythmic quality of soccer when rhythms are lacking or break down in matches.

When we speak of a game without rhythm, we often speak of a game with many imprecise passes or, alternatively, with many fouls. The Brazil-Colombia game at Brazil 2014 was a game without rhythm because of the many fouls, but also because both teams – especially Brazil – depend more on actions from individual players than from team “automatisms” when attacking. Dribbles and individual actions don’t depend on repetitions, on the contrary, they seem to be the opposite of repetitions (they are potential epiphanies, not of form, but of singular actions), and while such singular actions may be endowed with much beauty, they don’t provide the game with any rhythm (however, their arrhythmic nature are the opposite of fouls and bad passes, the other end of the scale of arrhythmia).

The epitome of rhythm and rhythmic soccer could be seen in the Brazil-Germany semifinal when the Germans scored their second, third, fourth and fifth goals. These goals did not materialize thanks to individual actions of genius but thanks to attacking patterns involving several players and several (short, long, lateral, and vertical) passes. The goals were culminations of “epiphanies of form” – form because a balance of repetition and variation were involved, epiphany because unexpected. In most cases, Toni Kroos played a leading role dictating the rhythm of these epiphanies of form.

He not only played this role in relation to Germany’s goals, though. During most of the match, and during most of Germany’s previous matches, Kroos has been setting and changing the tempo of games by shifting between short and long passes and between verticality and horizontality, always distributing his passes with the utmost precision and perfect timing.

It is interesting to speculate a little further about the value and existence of the great soccer maestro. If we look at the names I mentioned in the beginning of this article – Pirlo, Xavi, Modric, Scholes – they are all European players. The same with Kroos. I don’t think this is a coincidence. The maestro and pacesetter of games converges with a soccer philosophy in which team effort, masterplan, and collectivism are rated highly. On the contrary, teams and managers who build their strategy less on team automatisms and patterns and more on individual actions of genius (for example Argentina with Messi and Brazil with Neymar) are less likely to employ and develop maestros.

This is why Kroos for me is the unsung hero of the World Cup 2014. It may be that Argentina will be lifting the Jules Rimet trophy in Rio de Janeiro on Sunday, and Messi thus finally will be able to step out of the shadow of Maradona 1986, but Germany has been the best team playing the best soccer during the tournament, and the main reason behind this fact is Toni Kroos and his mastery of rhythms.

Editor’s note: Søren Frank is author of Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, which is available from all fine booksellers.

It’s getting closer, much closer. Today and tomorrow will decide who will meet each other in the 2014 World Cup final in Brazil. Four teams, four nations, are still in the race. Before the tournament, Brazil were red hot favorites. They still are. Apart from that, it is no surprise that Argentina and Germany are among the semifinalists. Perhaps it is a little surprising to find Holland still competing for the trophy. Before the tournament, nations like Italy, Spain and France may have held a bigger chance, at least if the bookies were asked. But the fact is, that the next World Champion will be found among Brazil, Argentina, Germany and Holland.

With globalization and mass migration the defining features of our epoch, the idea that continents and nations have certain characteristic and long-standing traditions of playing styles has been challenged within recent years. However, I would still argue that you see two widely different approaches when you look at the South American teams Brazil and Argentina compared to the European teams Germany and Holland. While you may detect differences – huge differences – between Argentina and Brazil as well as between Germany and Holland, there is a fundamental difference between the styles of the two South American and the two European teams. Basically, it comes down to individualism (with a strong collective ethos) versus collectivism (with a strong individualistic component).

Argentina and Holland are probably the most obvious examples of this. It hasn’t been a secret to anyone that so far Argentina have (much too) heavily relied on Lionel Messi’s individual strokes of genius. The team has played poorly. Marc Wilmots, the Belgian coach, said after their quarter final defeat to Argentina that the South American team was “ordinary”. He is right. But with Messi, anything can happen. Even Alejandro Sabella, their own coach, admits that sometimes they just play and hope Messi will do the trick for them. So far it has worked, but my guess is it will not take them all the way.

With Holland, we see a totally different approach. Even with superstars such as Robin van Persie, Arjen Robben and Wesley Sneijder, Louis van Gaal, the Dutch coach, has opted for an approach based on a solid defensive formation with collectivism, caution and counter attack being the main characteristics. Van Gaal hasn’t been afraid of changing his formation and tactics during the World Cup, often proving himself to be a tactical genius. Perhaps the match against Chile was the clearest example of his flexibility and tactical awareness as the Chileans were completely neutralized. In every match Van Gaal has shown us a masterplan – not just a masterplan in which he relies on a Messi, a Van Persie or a Robben, but a masterplan involving the whole team (even the bench, indeed the bench, from field players to goalies).

Brazil’s hopes of winning the World Cup has (as always one is tempted to say) relied much on their number 10, Neymar. In that sense, Argentina and Brazil are similar. However, the Brazilians have looked stronger than Argentina with more players able to contribute going forward (and their two central defenders able to score vital goals). But still their approach is based more on individual actions, less on team “automatisms.” Contingency and not pattern seems the dominant trait of their attacking style. Of course, Brazil is still playing on home soil, and the team – as for example in the game against Colombia – looks almost infused with energetic frenzy, and even without Neymar this may take them a long way. But as with Argentina, I don’t think they will be able to go all the way.

Germany may lack what Holland and Argentina have: a Messi or a Van Persie, that is, a proven goal scorer whose efficiency is very high. Miroslav Klose is not what he used to be, and Thomas Müller may be very adaptable, but he is not Gerd Müller. But you see a team plan when you watch the Germans. And you see a team who is meant to culminate in this tournament. Germany have individuals able to make the difference – Götze, Özil, Kroos – and at the same time they have a team unit based on organization (in defense) and patterns and automatisms (when attacking).

While (bad) luck will almost always play a significant role in knock out stages (just ask Chile and Pinilla), thus making it very difficult to predict a winner at this stage, my guess is that the Europeans will prevail because of their greater tactical acumen and collective ethos. Argentina and Sabella look planless, even with Messi. Brazil without Neymar, but on home soil, is a strong contender, but their game plan is a little too dependent on individual actions, a little too contingent. Germany look very strong and history is on their side – they do lack a real goal scorer, though. Holland with the tactical genius of Van Gaal, the speed and dribbling of Robben and the efficiency of Van Persie will be my bet on the next World Champions – even though history is not on their side.

Editor’s note: Søren Frank is author of Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, which is available from all fine booksellers.

After a disastrous David Moyes nine months-reign, most Manchester United fans welcomed the pre-World Cup news that the new manager in the Old Trafford hot seat would be the experienced and title-winning Dutch coach Louis van Gaal. Based on the results of Holland’s first three matches, all of those fans will still be wearing a smile on their faces. However, it may also be that quite a few of those smiling fans have been surprised by the way the Dutch team have approached their matches. It may even be that a certain share of those taken by surprise have become worried as to the future of Manchester United Football Club since Van Gaal has made his team play rather uncharacteristically in regard to Dutch traditions.

If United fans immediately came to think of speed, wingers, and possession when Van Gaal was appointed their club’s new manager, Holland’s three matches so far at the World Cup, resulting in three wins, have shown that the most appropriate way to characterize Van Gaal’s tactical approach and preferred formation is “extreme flexibility.” That is, if we put on our positive glasses. If we put on our negative glasses, we might instead use “lack of red thread” or “winning means everything” to describe Holland’s style.

From a tactical point of view, the match against Chile no doubt stands out as especially impressive since Van Gaal’s approach resulted in a complete neutralization of Chile’s most dangerous weapons, aggressive pressing and counter attacking. In this match, Van Gaal showed his Mourinho side. And back in Holland, Johan Cruyff was probably fuming because of Holland’s risk minimizing, non-possession football based on long balls and counter attack. It was un-Dutch, but highly effective, and it proved – yet again – to be a tactical masterclass from Van Gaal.

In the first game against the reigning world champions of Spain, Van Gaal’s approach was pretty similar – counter attack, solid and aggressive defending with five in the back, and cynical indifference as to possession – but whereas Chile never came close to winning, not to mention scoring a goal, against the Dutch, Spain missed a golden opportunity when leading with a goal just as Iker Casillas had his worst game ever. My point is that despite the devastating result – 5-1 – and despite a couple of world-class goals, the victory against Chile was in many ways more convincing, tactically speaking, than the demolition of Spain. If the approach (caution) and formation (5-3-2) were similar against Spain and Chile, Van Gaal reverted to the classic Dutch 4-3-3 formation with emphasis on wingers, speed, and possession in-between the two games against Spain and Chile, when his team were facing the underdogs and rather limited side from Australia. But the Dutch team was unconvincing against the Australians, only winning 3-2 after trailing 1-2.

If one has knowledge of Van Gaal’s managerial career, one also knows that the Dutch master minder has a history of employing different formations. At Ajax, when he took over from his mentor Leo Beenhakker, he used their traditional (and almost obligatory) 4-3-3. At Barcelona, Van Gaal has himself described the formation as 2-3-2-3. And at AZ Alkmaar, he won the Dutch championship employing a more traditional 4-4-2 formation. This history shows formational flexibility, and Manchester United fans worrying about a lack of red thread just have to look elsewhere than Van Gaal’s system, for example to his trophy cabinet. Here Van Gaal is a proven championship winner with every club he has managed. The two most impressive titles, the true proofs of his managerial abilities, would be the Champions League title with a very young Ajax team in 1995 and the Dutch championship title with unheeded AZ Alkmaar in 2009.

However, I would argue that it is also possible to find consistency on another level when speaking of Louis van Gaal. Formation no, trophies yes. But on the level of football philosophy, Van Gaal still adheres to the principles behind “total football” as they were developed by Rinus Michels, another of his Dutch mentors, in the early 1970s. Total football is not determined by a specific system (most people associate it with the Dutch 4-3-3, since it was introduced by Michels at Ajax). Instead, total football can be practiced within several formations. What makes it a coherent idea is the underlying philosophy. This philosophy is a sort of “science of (unoccupied) space”, in which positional changes or positional flexibility is highly valued, that is, players should be, to a certain degree at least, multifunctional. What Van Gaal looks for in players are first and foremost technique, insight, personality and speed. As his biographer Maarten Meijer sums it up: “Players who could play with both legs, had both defensive and offensive capabilities, were physically strong, were quick starters, had the necessary tactical acumen to function smoothly in rotation football, and, above all, put their skills in service of the team effort.” Team effort is another very important sub-part of the total football “vision”, which basically is a philosophy of collectivism (this emphasis on team above individual was the main reason behind Van Gaal’s fall-out with players such as Rivaldo at Barcelona and Ribéry at Bayern Munich who both felt restricted by his philosophy).

The question is, though, if Van Gaal has compromised with his vision of total football during the matches against Spain and Chile. Cruyff would undoubtedly answer in the affirmative. Even if there were elements of total football surviving in those matches – for example Robben’s speed, the Dutch team’s superior spatial awareness and intelligence, Van Persie’s creativity – one could argue that a lot of elements of total football were missing too. In an ideal world, the positional changes required of players in total football is supposed to lead to dominance in not merely spatial awareness but also in ball possession. This was neither the case against Spain nor against Chile. However, when being criticized after the Chile game, Van Gaal defended his tactics: “You just have to play according to your strengths, it’s all about winning. I’ll pick a system that helps me win. […] If I didn’t do that, you’d chop off my head. […] Me and my staff, we only ever want to score one goal more than the opponents.”

Now, this is Van Gaal speaking. It could as well have been José Mourinho, though. The latter, however, was always deemed too cautious, defensive, and cynical by the majority of United fans in terms of being a worthy candidate to carry on the Ferguson legacy. The appointment of Van Gaal, on the other hand, has been met by those same fans with only positive statements. The Dutch fans and experts were all skeptical when Van Gaal experimented with the 5-3-2 formation in the build up to Brazil, but results have shown that it works for a team and for players almost indoctrinated with 4-3-3. And it is very doubtful that Van Gaal would ever have ventured into the 5-3-2 experiment if Kevin Strootman hadn’t been hit by a nasty knee injury. Strootman was vital for Van Gaal’s 4-3-3 formation occupying the crucial position of defensive midfielder protecting the back four and passing on freedom to both backs, the two other midfielders and the three forwards to concentrate their main efforts on attacking. No one in Holland was able to replace Strootman, not even the martial Nigel de Jong. With him out, Van Gaal quite simply needed an extra central defender.

If skepticism has evaporated in relation to Van Gaal’s choice of formation, it remains part of daily discussions in Holland (and perhaps also among Manchester United fans) as to his preferred philosophy and vision (total football). If Van Gaal’s track record proves him to be flexible in regard to formation, but inflexible in regard to philosophy – a philosophy traditionally associated with fluidity, width, and speed – his recent matches have shown us a more result-oriented and perhaps even cynical Van Gaal.

In the Manchester United way as it was founded by Sir Matt Busby and carried on by Sir Alex Ferguson, winning was always important, but winning with style and vigor was even more important. However, the position in which the club finds itself at this moment, it may not be a bad idea with a manager who is a guarantor of victories, and who also has a well-documented reputation for giving young players a chance. And perhaps Van Gaal’s cynicism and “it’s-all-about-winning”-attitude aren’t that far away from the approach adopted by Ferguson in some matches, especially in Europe. Think of Manchester United’s Champions League matches against FC Barcelona in 2008 when they defeated the Catalans 1-0 on aggregate due to a long range shot from Paul Scholes, and think of their two Champions League matches against Real Madrid in 2013 when they only lost because Nani was controversially sent off. In both ties Ferguson demonstrated his ability to neutralize opposition teams with very cunning and cautious approaches. In those games Ferguson was giving us a tactical masterclass, just as Van Gaal has been doing against Chile and Spain. To me, the Dutch manager still seems to be the perfect choice for Old Trafford.

Editor’s note: Søren Frank is author of Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, which is available from all fine booksellers.

When the news broke that Sir Alex Ferguson was stepping down as manager of Manchester United and the name of his successor was revealed the following day, I was one of those who claimed that David Moyes was the logical and right choice. I expressed this belief on Danish television only minutes after Moyes had been officially “chosen”, but as it happens, I did in fact already indicate in the book Standing on the Shoulders of Giants that Moyes was the best bet, at least in terms of British candidates for the most impossible job in the world. But (and there is a “but” which has become only more visible in hindsight) I forgot to mention that Moyes being “the right choice” came with a precondition. The name of that precondition was René Meulensteen.

When it became clear in the course of July that Moyes had indeed made a clean cut and released Ferguson’s entire staff, I thus immediately felt the dark clouds assembling above Old Trafford. Ferguson is from Scotland, and so is Moyes. No problem in that. On the contrary, if one knows the history of Manchester United one also knows that the two most successful managers – Alex Ferguson and Matt Busby – are both Scots, and, apart from that, they both occupied the Old Trafford hot seat through more than twenty-five years. These facts, the Scottish connection and continuity, are some of the reasons why Moyes was the right and logical choice. In short, Manchester United have a deep love for both Scots and continuity, and this is why they not only chose Moyes, but also chose to give him a six-year contract. So far so good.

But in the wake of the fabulous Treble-winning season of 1999, a season where the Red Devils had shown what one could rightly label an uncompromising, but at times also naive all-out-attack mentality, Ferguson realised that the United engine was in urgent need of a continental component who could provide the team with tactical finesse and new training methods, since United were being punished in Europe for a similar tactic in the following season. In other words, Ferguson went looking for a new assistant manager to replace Steve McLaren, who after the Champions League final against Bayern München in 1999 went his own way. Ferguson found the cosmopolitan Portuguese Carlos Queiroz, and later he hired the Dutch Meulensteen. With their schooling in the Portuguese and Dutch football philosophy respectively, Queiroz and Meulensteen brought elements of technical flair, tactical flexibility and strategic intelligence into the United team. Neither must we forget that Queiroz, apart from his technical, tactical and strategic inputs, also kept his fellow countryman Cristiano Ronaldo happy, just as Meulensteen kept his fellow countryman Robin van Persie happy in the latter’s first season at Old Trafford. The importance in relation to man management of having a staff with a multinational composition is not to be underestimated in this era of globalized squads.

When Moyes led Meulensteen go, what did he then do? In contrast to the master, who had realised the need for a continental ingredient in Manchester United’s English and Celtic core, the apprentice brought with him Britishness, Britishness and Britishness. Worst case scenario for a United fan is indeed that Moyes quite simply brought Everton from Goodison Park to Old Trafford. The signs of this have been clear in several matches. But perhaps they were most unambiguous, and symbolically so, in the match against the very Everton team Moyes only abandoned a few months ago. With Roberto Martinez at the helm Everton not only dominated in large periods of the game against Manchester United at Old Trafford, they also secured their victory in what came close to being Fergie Time – that specific period of the match when United historically have excelled in pushing their opponents further and further up the Stretford End and scoring late winners.

Maybe I am too harsh on Moyes. Maybe I underestimate his own tactical intelligence. But I do fear another post-Busby era. Is that too pessimistic? Is it an untimely premonition (untimely because as a United fan one is committed to give Moyes a chance and committed to thinking long term)? Perhaps too pessimistic and untimely, yes, but Meulensteen’s exit was a bad decision. If it was a catastrophically bad decision, only time will tell.

And I guess we could leave it here, hanging in the air in good postmodern fashion. But there is a merciless point that we cannot neglect, namely that seven years are longer today than they were in 1986. And that is not all. It is also much more fatal for a club today to fall out of top 4 than it was then, not just because of financial reasons, but especially because it influences a club’s ability to attract players from the top-top shelf negatively. The consequence is a vicious circle which is almost impossible to break. Just look at Liverpool.

Søren Frank is the author of a brand new book about Manchester United entitled Standing On The Shoulders Of Giants. The book was recently reviewed by World Soccer Talk.