After the first two matches of the group stage, France looked like a serious contender to capture their second World Cup. But with a 0-0 draw against ten-man Ecuador side, some started to question whether France can keep their composure throughout the tournament, or if this team can easily slip up along the way. But not to worry; with France’s “A ½ squad” playing against Ecuador, there were still a few positives that came out of that match. So, can we take away from the France vs. Ecuador match that can be carried into the knockout stage?

1. Defense is solid and deep. : Even though Ecuador had a few quality opportunities during the match, French goalkeeper Hugo Lloris hardly had to break a sweat. The defense has remained solid in the three matches France has played so far. And while the starters in the first group game where impressive, the list is quite deep when it comes to defensive options.

It would be safe to assume that Mamadou Sakha and Raphael Varane will be the starters at central defense for France. But if one of these players have to be replaced for any reason, Eliaquim Mangala and Laurent Koscielny can easily plug in the holes. If France takes a commanding lead in this game, don’t be surprised if one, or both, of the center-backs are replaced, as France might be forced to play an aggressive defensive match against a speedy Nigerian team.

2. Evra/Dubuchy or Digne/Sagna? : If France wants to do an all-out attack, we should see the pairing of Patrice Evra and Mathieu Dubuchy playing wing-back positions. If France is worried about the attack, Lucas Digne and Bacary Sagna are a good defensive left and right back pairing. With Nigeria’s emphasis on speed and attacking, Didier Deschamps could consider using the Digne/Sagna pairing on Monday.

In Ligue 1 and in past French matches, left-backs tend to play more of a wing-back position while the right-backs usually have more of a defensive role. This was the pairing that Raymond Domenech used in the 2010 World Cup when he teamed up Evra and Sagna (though Sagna can transition to an offensive game if needed). There is a possibility that this could happen again, but it seems as if Deschamps is more comfortable with his left and right backs having accompanying roles. Still, having solely and offensive or defensive pairing might reveal how he will approach the match, which could benefit Nigeria.

3. Are Mathieu Valbuena and Olivier Giroud the keys for France?  In the Ecuador match, Karim Benzema didn’t have nearly as many chances as he did in the first two games. There are many reasons why this could the case. But one thing that is clearly apparent from the Ecuador match is that Benzema plays better with a speedy team. Mathieu Valbuena provides the lightning speed that helps grease the offensive wheel, and has the ability to quickly move east-to-west as he does north-to-south.

Moussa Sissoko and Antoine Griezmann have the skills to be a part of the offense, easily. But in the Ecuador match, these two lacked quality opportunities. Sissoko plays much better when he is dribbling the ball from the midfield instead of being on the receiving end of the ball in the offensive end. Griezmann also is more comfortable in that position, but coming from the left instead of the right like Sissoko.

In the match against Switzerland, we saw the perfect combination of offensive players for Deschamps’ side. Valbuena brings the speed that is needed to move the play up the field. This is even more apparent when he works with Debuchy on the right side, as these two can bypass distribution to the midfield, which pushes the midfield into the box. Olivier Giroud knows how to be at the right place at the right time, and is the perfect target man for Valbuena, as well as the attacking midfielders. As for Benzema, he has really taken control of the playmaker position which has been the difference-maker for France. While he will not be compared to the France’s last great #10 (and it would be a false comparison because of the role differences between Zinedine Zidane and Benzema), this World Cup could easily redeem Benzema from extremely poor international performances in the past.

4. France has to prepare for the unknown. France will play the early match on Monday. With this being the case, Deschamps has to be tactical with his substitutions during the match. As many of us know, Germany can play a physical knock-down, drag-out game. As for Algeria, the situation is quite interesting. Knowing that a win against Germany would mean a match against their former colonial powers (and the breakaway of Algeria from France was NOT peaceful, for those who do not know the history of the relationship between the two nations), Algeria might bring their “A-game” against the Germans, to possibly pull off the upset. For Deschamps, this could be both good and bad. If Algeria leaves everything out on the field against Germany, they might be quite tired against France. On the flip side, many of the players have Ligue 1 experience, as well as Algerian coach Vahid Halihodzic, who coached Lille, PSG and Rennes.

France will be faced with a number of challenges against Nigeria, but with the many interchanging pieces that the team has, Didier Deschamps will not be afraid to use them.

In 2010, France was the laughing stock of the World Cup. With a dismal performance, Nicolas Anelka being sent home, the team opposing the coach, and then the so-called “strike”, France was doomed. But if anyone knows French national team football, France seems to go through cycles. In 1998 and 2006, France played exceptionally well. In 2002 and 2010, they were extremely embarrassing. If the cycle continues, 2014 should be an “exceptionally good” year. So far, that seems to be the case.

The biggest change for France has been at coach, from Raymond Domenech in the 2010 World Cup to Didier Deschamps in the 2014 World Cup (with Laurent Blanc in the position in between). The way that these men have coached the French team has been night and day. Here are some of the main differences between Domenech and Deschamps. As you will be able to see, France does have a new look. And right now, it seems to be working to create a stirring rebirth of “Les Bleus.”

Defense – In the Domenech era, the defense was more fluid in their approach, whereas they are more rigid under Deschamps. Domenech would have his defenders close down on the player with the ball, with the defending midfielders offering support, as well as taking control of any lose ball in order to start the counter attack. The problem with this approach is that when the opposing player would move the ball to one side of the pitch, the opposite side would be venerable, and allow an unmarked player in alone on goal. As for Deschamps, players stay within their positions, covering more of the east-west sides of the pitch. This closes the holes for the opposition. As with Domenech, the midfielders are still part of the defensive play for Deschamps, but the transition is much different, which will be discussed later.

Another change in the defense is that Deschamps allows the right and left defenders to be part of the offensive play. While Patrice Evra has always been allowed to push forward, he has been able to push up much high than under Domenech. Mathieu Dubuchy has also been able to be involved with the offensive play. The possible reason for this is Deschamps plays the traditional French 4-3-3 formation, while Domenech had a tendency to play a 4-4-2, which limited the forward push by his left and right defenders, which also slowed the transition.

Midfield – One of the biggest differences between Domenech and Deschamps is the way that the play transitions from the defensive midfielders to the forwards. Domenech relied on two strong defensive midfielders controlling the ball, such as Jeremy Toulalan and Claude Makelele. That would then be accompanied by two strong offensive-minded midfielders, like Zinedine Zidane and Franck Ribery.  Players like Toulalan and Makelele rarely pushed up high, and Ribery rarely dropped back (though Zidane did some times).

With Deschamps, the midfielders have more of a box-to-box mentality, with the midfielder who is playing the defensive role (which has mostly been Yohan Cabaye) bringing the ball up themselves. Paul Pogba, Yohan Cabaye and Moussa Sissoko are all box-to-box midfielders who can be interchangeable parts of the French midfield.

Also, the midfield selection by Deschamps offers an element of surprise. With the Domenech system, the pass from the defensive midfield to attacking midfield was always expected, and interceptions by the opposing midfield were quite easy. With Deschamps’ system, the midfielders can either push the ball forward themselves, pass it up to one of the attacking midfielders, or dish it off to a streaking defender on the left or right, which would then offer more offensive options once the ball is in the attacking third.

Offense – In the case of the offense, there is a flip in offensive and defensive strategies for these two coaches. Deschamps is allowing his attacking players to roam more freely in the offensive third, while Domenech was more rigid. Domenech only seemed to trust Thierry Henry and Franck Ribery to attack the net while dribbling in the ball. Even Zidane did much less dribbling into the box under Domenech than he did under Aime Jacquet, Roger Lemerre or Jacques Santini. He was also very reserved in allowing Karim Benzema to move out of position (which was noticeable during the 2008 Euros). For Deschamps, all the players are allowed more freedom in the offensive third. Moving up the box-to-box midfielders and allowing defenders to push high on the flanks has led to more room for Benzema and Mathieu Valbuena to produce goals. Most of the offensive players look comfortable on the pitch, much different that under Domenech.

Possible Intangible? Another interesting note is that there seems to be much more respect by the team for Deschamps than with Domenech. One must wonder if this is because of the lack of a generational gap between players and coach. In the case of Deschamps, the players on this team were probably kids sitting around the television when Deschamps raised the World Cup trophy in front of President Chirac in 1998. Therefore, there is a level of respect for Deschamps and those on the 1998 World Cup-winning team. Domenech didn’t have this connection, and very few of his players were able to respect him in the same way. While this is just a stab-in-the-dark comment regarding player commitment to the coach, I think it is possibility that should be considered.

Overall, Deschamps has been making excellent decisions for France during this World Cup. From formation to player selection, he has done everything right for the team. The biggest difference has to be the role in which the midfield transitions the play. So far, it has been quite successful and has opened up France’s game.

At the end of the 2009-2010 Ligue 1 season, Olympique de Marseille (OM) was sitting pretty. They had won the Ligue 1 title as well as captured the Coupe de la Ligue. And with the coming season, new players entering the fold made it look like OM could be successful for the long haul.

But soon the face of Ligue 1 would change. Gone was the tradition of the league being French-centric, and in came the international face that we all know today.  With the international aspect, high-profile transfer rumors are more of “the talk of the town” than predictions on who will win the Ligue 1 title. International coverage has shifted from focusing on the entire league to covering only specific teams, such as AS Monaco and Paris St.-Germain. Overall, the face of Ligue 1 has changed. Whether this new move is better for Ligue 1 can be debated, but it is happening nonetheless.

With this new change, will Olympique de Marseille be able to keep up with the changing face of Ligue 1? Before the internationalization of Ligue 1, OM was arguably the best club as far as bringing in new players. The reason for their success is that they were able to pluck top players from other Ligue 1 teams and put them into their system. For example, Didier Drogba, Mathieu Valbuena and Loic Remy were from smaller clubs, but were easily capable of playing for the top teams in Ligue 1, which made the transition to OM quite easy. Other players, like Hatem Ben Arfa, were rarely being used by their club’s senior-level squad, but were able to make immediate impacts on arrival to Marseille. And, occasionally, Marseille would bring in players from other leagues, like Gabriel Heinze, Lucho Gonzalez and César Azpilicueta.

While this method of team-building worked well in Ligue 1 a couple of years ago, it might not work today. Marseille isn’t competing with the new “big boys” when it comes offering top dollar for players that they desire. Because of this, not only will they not be able to field the best team in Ligue 1, but they also might have to start selling more players, especially if they command a good transfer fee. Recently, talks have been swirling around regarding the possible departure of Valbuena, Andre-Pierre Gignac and Morgan Amalfitano to clubs in other leagues. Marseille must now struggle with the decision of either keeping those players so that they can field a competitive team, or run an Aulas-Lacombe-style system like Lyon, where every player has a price.

But even with a Lyon-style system, there is a problem. In the past, Lyon was able to sell many of their top-notch players because they had an impressive youth system. This is something that has been going downhill for Marseille recently. Yes, some great players have come out of their youth system, most notably Samir Nasri in recent years, but these are more the exception at Marseille than the rule. Because Marseille relied on building a club through transfers, the youth program has suffered. On the other hand, Lyon and Paris St. Germain have had very strong youth programs, with lower-level teams such as Ligue 2’s Lens providing future superstars as well. Therefore, with more competition in the transfer market and the lack of good youth prospects, Marseille might be heading down a long and gloomy road.

So, how can Marseille possibly compete against the up-and-coming “big boys”? It all depends on what Margarita Louis-Dreyfus, OM’s owner, wishes to do with the team. There is no doubt that she wants to see the team succeed, but at what price? As one of the richest women in the world, she has the opportunity to make Marseille a force in the transfer market. But so far, the actions do not show that to be the case with Marseille being somewhat inactive in the off-season. True, OM has brought in Dimitri Payet, who will help improve Marseille. But will Payet be OM’s biggest name coming into the system because the transfer market is so competitive? So far it looks like that is the case.

Another option that Louis-Dreyfus has is to sell the team. Marseille, much like PSG, would fetch top dollar as well as a lot of foreign investment interest. But the likelihood of Margarita selling the team isn’t high. The team succeeding seems to be more of a labor of love, as well as a tribute to her late husband Robert. Her actions do not seem to be driven by money, which means that OM will more than likely stay in the hands of the Louis-Dreyfus family.

A third, and more realistic way to help build Olympique de Marseille is by promoting the tradition of the club. Since Marseille is France’s most popular club with the strongest fan base, OM has been the childhood team for many French players. Therefore, the prospect of playing on the same team as their childhood heroes might lure many quality French players to Marseille. Andre-Pierre Gignac considered it a dream to play for OM when he was transferred there in 2010. Maybe this route could convince more players to come to Marseille.

Overall, Marseille has a lot on their plate. With Monaco and PSG pushing the transfer-record envelope, OM has to decide if they want to spend the same money as the new powerhouse teams, build their youth system, or come up with other unique ways to build their club. If the internationalization of Ligue 1 continues, then Marseille either have to go with the flow, or they will be left behind.

Going into the 2013-14 Ligue 1 season, all the talk is centered around AS Monaco FC. With Monaco’s tax advantages causing quite the controversy, the prospective Ligue 1 powerhouse makes a strong case for players to transfer to The Principality. Dmitry Rybolovlev and his millions bring in the kind of purchasing power that Ligue 1 has only seen once, and that is with the current Paris St.-Germain organization. But was the purchase of AS Monaco FC by the Russian billionaire the right choice for future investment?

Currently, the debate regarding the Monaco purchase centers around the tax advantages that AS Monaco’s staff, players and organization will receive by being based in Monaco. With the Ligue de Football Professionnel (or LFP) stating that Monaco will have to move its operations to France by this time next year, the team continues to fight the decision in court to keep their advantageous edge in France’s top club level. The tax status has already netted the club top-notch players, both with and without Ligue 1 experience, and they will more than likely be a successful team in the French league. Paris St.-Germain has already shown that throwing tons of money into a team will bring success.

But even with that, was AS Monaco FC the right choice for Rybolovlev? When looking at the surface, most observers are only looking at the situation in a skin-deep manner. They only center on the tax debate without looking at other factors. The argument is that top-notch players will automatically consider Monaco as their top transfer destination purely because of taxes. But if we look at the case of Zlatan Ibrahimovic at PSG, even an income tax of 75% didn’t prevent the player from making the move to France’s capital. The question then needs to be asked if the tax issue has been blown out of proportion. Yes, the tax advantages are nice for players as well as foundation for building a strong club, but where is it on the list of player priorities? Are taxes the “end-all” when it comes to contract negotiations, or just a nice convenient factor?

Even with the tax debate, there are a number of other factors that any buyer of Monaco should have been worried about. It seems that the idea of having a tax-free team has led Rybolovlev to not even consider these other factors. But in the end, they might be the factors that determine if Monaco is a successful investment or not.

The first factor that has to be considered is AS Monaco’s fan base. Year after year, Monaco ranks among the bottom (if not the bottom as far as percentage of seats occupied) in Ligue 1 and Ligue 2 attendance. If we look at the last time that Monaco was in Ligue 1, which was the 2010-11 season, their attendance rarely exceeded 10,000 spectators. What is even more interesting is if we examine visiting teams that usually draw a crowd, like Marseille — only 10,991 showed up to see OM play at the Stade Louis II. In comparison, 49,384 showed up at The Velodrome to see visiting Monaco play Marseille. This trend continues with the other top teams as well. With Lyon, only 11,140 fans showed up to Stade Louis II, with 35,257 showing up at the Stade Gerland for Monaco.

In both the Marseille and Lyon case, travel from these cities to Monaco is less than three hours away, so many of the fans attending the games could be from the visiting side. So what about other clubs that are located further away? The numbers get worse. PSG only drew 9,338, Lille only 7,986 and Bordeaux only 5,023. In the case of Bordeaux, only 27% of the Stade Louis II was occupied.

An important factor when examining fan bases in French football is that they cannot be artificially created. Even if a team is successful on the European level (which Monaco has had small success), that success isn’t transferred over into international, or even local, popularity. We can look at both PSG and Marseille, the French clubs with the largest international following, and see that their fan base still remains strongly rooted in France. With that being said, Monaco still needs to actually build a French fan base before they can even consider building an international base.

One thing that seems to have been misunderstood by Dmitry Rybolovlev’s people is the concept of sport in France. French sport supporters are very rigid on what sports they follow. Some like soccer and only soccer. Some like rugby and only rugby. Some like both sports, and some like neither. With that being said, it is less likely to bring new fans into French football that aren’t already there. In addition to sports loyalty, there is also rigid team loyalty. Supporters who are OGC Nice fans won’t jump over to support AS Monaco FC because it is a newly successful team that is close. Nice fans will remain Nice fans through thick and thin. Therefore, Monaco won’t be able to get new fans from other sports or other teams, because it just doesn’t happen that way in France.

A problem that Monaco also faces is the size of the country, which only has a population of 36,000 people. With such a limited population, it will be hard to build a fan base. And, as previously mentioned, OGC Nice has captured the population of Nice, which is currently over 340,000 residents. If Monaco had a larger population, they could build a larger fan base. One example of this happening is in another sport, which is ice hockey. The Chicago Blackhawks were one of the worst teams as far as attendance in the National Hockey League in 2006. But once the team started winning championships, they sold more seats to games, and currently have one of the longest sellout streaks in the NHL. The reason why this is the case is that Chicago has the population to support a successful hockey club and become financially stable because of the population. Monaco severely lacks in this. With Nice to the west and Italy to the east, Monaco will have a hard time filling their stands on a regular basis.

Another issue that is a problem for Monaco, as well as for all Ligue 1 teams, is the lack of promotion in the English-language markets. It can be argued that the United States has the most fluid soccer fan base in the world, with kids from the St. Louis suburbs supporting an English club from a city that they have never visited. But because of the promotion of these clubs by the English-speaking media, teams like Liverpool, Manchester United and Chelsea have a strong American following with absolutely no connection whatsoever between club and fan. Basically, American fans “pick” their team of support. Even non-English teams, such as Real Madrid and Barcelona, benefit from the English language exposure. But French football hasn’t tried to break into the English-speaking market. And when they have tried, the attempts have been halfhearted and filled with problems. This will surely hurt Monaco, who will rely on a new fan base “picking” Monaco as their favorite team, since organically growing a fan base will not be possible.

The problems mentioned above just focus on the fan base. But what about the actual players coming into the system? While many players are disciplined, there are others who will take advantage of the glitz and glamor that a Monaco lifestyle offers. The best example of this is Eiður Guðjohnsen. Guðjohnsen arrived in Monaco from Barcelona in 2009 and immediately gained the reputation of being a Monaco playboy. As a result, Guðjohnsen only played nine games for The Principality, then was immediately loaned to Tottenham and then quickly sold to Stoke City in 2010. If players who arrive in Monaco aren’t disciplined, they could see a similar fate to Eiður Guðjohnsen.

If we look deeper into Monaco, we can see that just having an advantageous tax status doesn’t necessarily mean that AS Monaco will be successful financially. They will more than likely be successful on the pitch, possibly even winning a Ligue 1 title and advancing far in future European competitions. But there is also a chance of the club being perpetually in the red. This doesn’t even factor in other issues, such as the Guðjohnsen episode, that can give the organization even more headaches. In the end, Dmitry Rybolovlev’s choice of Monaco might not have been the wisest.

So, if Monaco isn’t the best choice in France, what would be? There are a few smaller clubs that can easily be built up into mega-teams if the right buyer comes along. The best example of this would be Paris Football Club, or Paris FC. Currently, Paris FC is in France’s third division, the Championnat National, which means a small initial investment could see the club advance to Ligue 2 rapidly.

Not only does Paris FC have a financial advantage, they have a few wild cards as well. First, they have the word “Paris” in their name, which can easily bring both local and possible international recognition if they were to ever make it to Ligue 1. Second, a rivalry between Paris FC and PSG could be reignited. A strong rivalry started in the early 1970s between the two clubs when Paris FC split from PSG, which oddly saw Paris FC remaining in the First Division, while PSG was relegated to the Third Division. This rivalry could also lead to additional support. PSG’s biggest rival, Marseille, has a large fan base in Paris. With the addition of a new Paris-based rival, those OM fans living in Paris might consider Paris FC as their “number two” team, purely based out of the PSG-OM rivalry. Third, Paris FC’s stadium, Stade Charléty has a capacity of 20,000 and already qualifies for the minimum requirement of seats needed to be a Ligue 1 team. Also, the stadium is located in a different neighborhood than PSG’s Parc des Princes. True, Paris is known as a “rugby city,” but the overall population is more than enough to support two strong football teams.

While being the best example, Paris FC is just one example of French teams out there that can be purchased at a bargain with possibly bigger profits than Monaco. When putting other factors into play, teams like Paris FC can be successful. On the other hand, Monaco has already had their time in the limelight, which includes European success, and has still not been able to show that they can build, much less retain a loyal fan base and bring in profits to justify overspending on a team. With a little more research, Dmitry Rybolovlev might have chosen his team more wisely. But the “no taxes” idea seems to have led to a snap judgment.

In November of 2014, Germans will celebrate the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. For decades, the Wall conjured up a number of negative feelings. While some said the Wall was built to keep East Germans from fleeing to West German, it can also be argued that the Wall was built to keep West German ideas from making their way to the East. Either way, the idea behind the Wall was to have a physical, social and economic divide between the two parts of Germany.

During the time of the Wall, one of the many divides that existed was in football. While the West German Bundesliga thrived with successful clubs, the same could not be said for the DDR-Oberliga. With the exception of some moderate success in Europe, which saw FC Magdeburg make it to the Cup Winner’s Cup final in 1974, most of the league was dominated by only three teams, which included FC Madgeburg, as well as Dynamo Dresden and Berliner FC Dynamo. In comparison to their West German counterparts, these teams did not have the caliber of coaches, staff and overall talent, and were rarely able to compete at football’s highest level. In the case of Berliner FC Dynamo, their connection to secret East German police, the Stasi, led to them winning ten straight championships between 1979 and 1989, mostly through corruption, intimidation, match fixing and a slew of other ethical questions.

Today, many East German football clubs still have had a hard time adjusting to a unified German Bundesliga. Some clubs, such as Berliner FC Dynamo and Dynamo Dresden, have decided to keep their communist past, as well as their East German-connected names, alive and well today. Other teams, such as FC Erzgebirge Aue, have shed most of their communist history and are concentrating on the present.

Even with this transformation, there is one thing that each team shares, which is a common connection to the idea of East Germany. Even the most anti-GDR establishment clubs, such as FC Union Berlin, still identify themselves as East German. While not necessarily supporting old East German values, they do show a sense of pride in being, if you like, Ost-Enders.

All of this might be explained through the idea of “socialist socialization”. After the end of World War II, Germany was eventually split up into East and West Germany. But what did it mean to be “East German”? Prior to 1945, Germans simply referred to themselves as Germans, since there was no distinction between East and West. This is mainly because the East-West lines were purely a result of post-WWII policy.

Since communism didn’t have any place in the old Germany, the creation of East Germany meant that a new “East German identity” had to be created. The newly created GDR government had to make their citizens “proud to be East German,” which was an entirely new concept.

There were two very important factors in building an East German identity. First, the GDR’s identity had to include the concept of socialism. The idea of a socialist government was new, as well as the political philosophy itself. Therefore, the East German authorities started to introduce the ideas of socialism in schools, the workplace, and even sports. While East Germany did have some of its own homegrown socialism, such as the works of Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, many communist ideas were borrowed from the Soviet Union. One of the biggest marks of this Soviet-borrowing was seen in the structure of sports organizations. Betriebssportgemeinschaft, or “company sports community”, connected certain aspects of the East German workplace and society to particular sporting clubs. For example, any club with Lokomotive in the title referred to their association with state-run railway company Deutsche Reichsbahn. Those with the name Dynamo connected teams with local police organizations. Therefore, East German sports clubs, especially those formed after World War II, were already starting to show proletariat qualities, as former sports clubs were seen as tools of the bourgeois.

The second idea behind socialist socialization was to create a separate East German history. Because the country was new, there were no East German historical traditions. Eventually, this would change throughout the years as the connection between East German and the Soviet Union led to historical achievements. But prior to this, there was no East German-specific history.

What is also important to note is that West Germany assumed the identity of “being German”, but not “West German”. Some might consider this a hijacking of German values by the West, but East Germany was more than happy to give West Germany all of Germany’s historical past. While there are many reasons behind this, there are two important reasons that need to be mentioned. First, old German history didn’t have a connection to socialism, so it was automatically rejected. Second, East Germany used Germany’s old history to claim that West Germany was the new “fascist state”, and nearly equated West Germans to the post-WWII Nazi movement.

With the groundwork being established, let’s fast-forward to modern-day Germany. Did socialist socialization work? Well, the answer is yes, but to differing degrees. As far as creating a pro-socialist society, the socialization does have a moderate impact. The Left party (or Die Linke), which was the successor to the GDR Communist Party (or SED), is still strong electorally in the East today. And while anti-GDR teams like FC Union Berlin were seen to be against the establishment, they aren’t necessarily anti-socialist teams. Basically, socialism wasn’t the enemy in East Berlin, but the authoritarian characteristics of the East German state were the enemy.

While the socialist aspect of socialization has mixed reviews, the creation of an East German identity was extremely successful. The best example of this is embodied in, yet again, FC Union Berlin. During the time of communism, Union Berlin was not only considered the most anti-GDR football club, but they were also the natural rival to the Stasi’s Berliner FC Dynamo, as both teams were located in Berlin. Those who were against the communist government, but were too afraid to take to the streets, instead took to the Stadion An der Alten Försterei, where they would show their anti-establishment feelings through songs and chants while cheering on FC Union Berlin. The Stasi would eventually keep a record of those who attended FC Union Berlin matches, which was later revealed after the declassification of Stasi files after the reunification.

Even though FC Union Berlin was openly against the establishment, the establishment did impact the views of Union Berlin. Like other East German clubs, supporters of FC Union Berlin still consider themselves strong East Germans and East Berliners. A 2001 article in The Telegraph newspaper makes this point clearly in an article about FC Union Berlin:

“The supporters, of course, are east Berliners through and through. A proposal to play next season’s big European matches in West Berlin’s Olympic Stadium led fans to plan angry demonstrations for the summer.

“East Berlin and the bad old days made us what we are. We must never betray our roots and our past. The next step is to become as big as Hertha. With our history and our charisma it can be done.”

Therefore, socialist socialization has worked in transforming the opinion of East Germans along post-WWII geographical lines. But what about the future of East Germans and club football? Socialist socialization might still have the last say. Clubs such as Berliner FC Dynamo have been highly unsuccessful in post-unification football.  Dynamo Dresden, while still hanging around in 2 Bundesliga, continue to struggle. On the other hand, other clubs, such as FC Union Berlin, have been able to build toward the future by trying to build a team that can compete in Germany’s top flight of football.

The different paths of German football might be most noticeable in the derby between FC Union Berlin and Berliner FC Dynamo. Dynamo, once the powerhouse of East German football, has now been reduced to a suburban East Berlin team that has been mired in hooliganism. As for FC Union Berlin, who were spied on by the Stasi and forced to transfer players under the old GDR system, they have moved on from their anti-Stasi past (though it is still a rich part of their history), and now have their eyes focused making Berlin a two-team city, by creating a friendly rivalry with Hertha Berlin. Yes, the team has had financial troubles in the past, but it seems that those problems might have also stayed in the past.

If Union Berlin succeeds in promotion to the Bundesliga in the near future, the model that they created could be a template for future East Berlin teams. That model is to accept your past, but look toward the future. Union Berlin accepts that they are East German, which was an identity created by the old GDR (who they openly rejected), and have used that to help build their identity. Still, this identity hasn’t blinded them from trying to move forward to become Berlin’s next top-flight team. But Berliner FC Dynamo has not been able to put the past behind them. A recent spat between the Berliner FC Dynamo and the German Football Association regarding the awarding of championship stars for Dynamo’s ten DDR-Oberliga championships shows the lack of moving forward by the former Stasi club. Berliner FC Dynamo argued that their ten championships should be recognized by the German Football Association.  The Association said that they do not recognize DDR-Oberliga titles, especially those by Berliner FC Dynamo, who obtained the titles by manipulation. Eventually the German Football Association allowed former East German teams to display their championship stars. Still, the GDR’s rejection of pre-war history almost cost the most pro-GDR team title recognition for past titles.

One saying in East Germany is that “the wall is still in the mind of East Germans”. This isn’t only happening in society, but in football as well. For East German football to be successful, clubs who seek to break down this wall will more than likely have a chance of succeeding in German football. Those who keep those walls up are almost certain to fail.