Pablo Mastoreni didn’t set out to be a manager.
It was the winter of 2013. FC Dallas was looking for a coach, and the then-Colorado Rapids manager Oscar Pareja — who had spent fourteen years in Dallas before moving to Colorado — wanted the job.
The interest was mutual. Pareja was a rising star in the MLS coaching ranks, known already for his player development skills and ability to mold young teams. Dallas was a young team, and Pareja wanted to come home. It was a perfect fit.
But with Pareja still under contract in Colorado, the Rapids fought the move tooth and nail. The saga dragged into the new year until Pareja finally was allowed to resign and sign with Dallas in exchange for the Rapids receiving Dallas’ first round draft pick and allocation money.
Enter Mastroeni. The Rapids legend had just retired after playing the 2013 season with the LA Galaxy, and was planning on rejoining Colorado in some capacity for the 2014 season. When Pareja left, with his club in a pinch, Mastroeni was made interim manager.
Mastroeni’s coaching career should have ended there. But the Rapids took no serious steps towards hiring a permanent manager in the following two months, and in March — with the season a week away — Mastroeni was thrown into the deep end.
With zero coaching experience, five months after the end of his playing career, he was named the permanent coach.
It was, predictably, a disaster. Mastroeni inherited a playoff team full of promising young players, but by the end of his first season in charge, the roster was a mess and the Rapids had finished next-to-last in the Western Conference.
2015 was even worse. Colorado finished bottom of the Western Conference, winning just nine times all year and scoring less than a goal per game. The soccer was unwatchable, the team was irrelevant, and there appeared to be no coherent vision for its future.
Mastroeni plainly had no idea what he was doing. Many of the players emerging under Pareja — Dillon Powers, Chris Klute, Clint Irwin, DeShorn Brown — were either benched or shipped out and replaced with journeymen veterans like Kevin Doyle and Sean St. Ledger.
And if that wasn’t bad enough, the Rapids were playing the most regressive soccer in the league — regularly, even at home, sitting ten players behind the ball and breaking out only sporadically.
But instead of parting ways with Mastroeni after 2015, the Rapids doubled down on him. To help the offense, they brought on former Portland Timbers manager John Spencer — that paragon of beautiful attacking soccer — as an assistant coach, and started splashing the cash.
2016 was a charmed year. Behind a phenomenal defense — bolstered midyear by the addition of Tim Howard — the Rapids finished second in the Western Conference and came within a game of MLS Cup.
The run bought Mastroeni time. But it didn’t do much more than that. The Rapids were still playing ugly soccer, they were still the second-lowest scoring team in the league, and they’d gone a crazy 13-4 in one-goal games.
Great. Now please do something about Jim Curtin.
Bit late to the article here. One thing you have left out about the club’s recent debacles (though you elude to it with “worst run club in the past decade” is the sophomoric team of Paul Bravo and Tim Hinchey. Bravo an accomplished ex-MLSer with minimal managerial ability, and Tim Hinchey, an American with minimal soccer IQ who thought he could lead a franchise after a couple years in Derby County UK. Both intended to re-invent the wheel (well not really, they just had a shitie plan) with managing the Rapids and just made it about as bad as you can get it with already questionable ownership in KSE. Sure, the article was about Pablo, not all that, but the real reasons behind such a horrible coaching hire should be touched upon at least. Hinchey and Bravo. Both are gone thankfully.